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Notwithstanding the continuing debate over the future of managed care and the
appropriate protections to be included in a Patient's Bill of Rights, the safeguarding
of patient privacy and the reduction of medical error have emerged as the dominant
health law issues. Displacing even the implications of the advances in genornics
from the front and editorial pages of our newspapers, privacy and medical error have
left the cozy world of professional journals and political platitudes to demand
corrective action.
The issue of data privacy already possessed some serious political credentials
before the Clinton administration ushered health privacy to center stage by its
promulgation of regulations under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).' Public visibility was increased by the Bush
administration's very vocal dissatisfaction with the regulations,2 followed by its well
publicized, though probably temporary, capitulation.3 Only recently has medical
error resurfaced as an issue of comparable weight attracting public and political
concern. 4 A series of publications by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) have not only
highlighted the quality flaws in our current system, but have intensified the debate
beyond clich6d calls for action by appending highly concrete suggestions for
amelioration of the problem.
This article argues that the forces driving increased privacy and reduced medical
error are closely related; that they find common ground in process re-engineering and
the adoption of technologies that conceptually, architecturally and operationally will
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I Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1988
(codified as amended scattered in portions of 29 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
2 See Robert O'Harrow Jr., Protecting Patient Data, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2001, at E01.
3 Press Release, HHS PRESS OFFICE, Statement by HHS Secretary Tommy G. Thompson
Regarding the Patient Privacy Rule, Apr. 12, 2001, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ncws.
4 See, e.g., Medical Error Reduction Act of 2000, S. 2038, 106th Cong. (2000).
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intersect and frequently combine.5  The new and controversial federal medical
privacy regulations should be put into perspective and recognized as a relatively
minor, albeit laudable, component of a broader thrust to update our delivery system to
improve, among other things, the quality of care. Additionally, this article argues
that increased privacy regulation will further stimulate emerging eHealth6 business
models as improved privacy and security accelerate the utilization and acceptability
of computer-mediated healthcare delivery.
In addition to exploring the close and dynamic relationship between health
privacy and medical error, this article examines how the infrastructure developments
and new privacy regulations will more immediately and often unintentionally reshape
one of our extant quality assurance systems-malpractice law. In this regard, it
examines how traditional substantive malpractice law is already reacting to changes
in healthcare technologies, suggesting that aspects of the privacy regulations will
have serious, albeit unanticipated, effects on doctrines such as informed consent and,
by reducing false positives, the overall level of malpractice-based risk reallocation.
Part II begins with a discussion of the process and technological implications of
the federal government's regulation of medical privacy, particularly in terms of its
structure and architecture. Part III will examine the role of technology in reducing
medical error. The remainder of the article focuses on the more technical legal
implications of the interaction between privacy regulation and the drive to reduce
error. In this context, Part IV will scrutinize the impact of privacy regulation and
eHealth on substantive malpractice law. Part V will examine the relationship
between consent-to-disclosure in privacy regimes and informed consent. Finally,
Part VI will discuss the operational or process implications of new privacy and
security regimes on malpractice litigation.
II. BEYOND PRIVACY: ARCHITECTURAL AND QUALITY IMPLICATIONS
OF "ADMINISTRATIVE SIMPLIFICATION"
At first glance, protecting privacy and improving quality seem to implicate
diametrically opposed operational imperatives. The protection of privacy suggests a
need to decrease the flow of patient-related information, whereas maximizing
information and minimizing information costs are key strategies aimed at improving.
the quality of care. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. The overall
HIPAA-mandated system is driven by a desire to invigorate the flow of medical
5 Some limited intersections have previously been identified. See. e.g., James G. Hodge, Jr. et
al., Legal Issues Concerning Electronic Health Information Privacy. Quality, and Liability, 282 JAMA
1466, 1466 (1999).
6 eHealth has been defined in the following terms:
E-health or, as e-commerce analysts term it, e-health space refers to the
delivery of health information, diagnosis, treatment and other services or
healthcare transactions using information technologies, particularly those
utilizing the Web or Internet. The "space" includes such familiar interactions as
telemedicine, physician-patient e-mail communications and online prescribing.
More recently, however, considerable attention has been paid to what are known
as business-to-business transactions between providers, insurers, and other
institutions, transactions that impact financing and the confidentiality and
security of patient records.
Nicolas P. Terry, Structural and Legal Implications of E-Health, 33 J. HEALTH L. 605, 605 n.l (2000).
See also Gunther Eysenbach, What is e-Health?, 3 J. MED. INTERNET RESEARCH e20 (2001), available
at http://www.jmir.org/2001/2/e20/index.htm; Vincenzo Della Mea, What is e-Health (2): The Death of
Telemedicine?, 3 J. MED. INTERNET RESEACRH e22 (2001), available at http://www.jmir.org/2001/2/
e22/index.htm.
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information; data protection was appended only to preempt likely provider attempts
to externalize the inevitable privacy costs. 7
The relationship between privacy and quality, however, goes beyond the
operational to the architectural. It is not a clean relationship; it is frequently non-
linear while intersections occur at several levels. First, it is true that HIPAA's
"Administrative Simplification," which begat our new federal health privacy
regulations, was "sold" to the healthcare industry on the basis of its cost-saving
architecture. However, on closer examination the improvement of healthcare quality
seems to have been an equally strong rationale. Second, the process and technology
architecture that will be required to comply with HIPAA-and achieve the promised
cost extraction-will lend itself very nicely to the next generation of medical error
reducing systems. Third, many of our existing error reducing systems have been
ineffective because of provider non-compliance or because our existing systems fail
to generate appropriate data. The data architecture and information technology (IT)
infrastructure contemplated by HIPAA will likely reinvigorate those systems and
their dependent reporting structures. Fourth, consumers will respond positively to
improvements in the protection of medical privacy with increased demand for
technologically-mediated medicine and online information about healthcare and
healthcare providers.
The healthcare industry's attention has been tightly focused on the new HIPAA
privacy regulations. 8 Indubitably, many providers view them as an unwelcome and
extremely expensive example of governmental overreaching and overregulation. 9
Equally, privacy advocates welcome the regulations.10 Whatever their merits,
however, the privacy regulations are merely a means to an end. Furthermore, the
privacy regulations are only a relatively minor, albeit costly, component of HIPAA,
just as HIPAA's "Administrative Simplification" is only a component of the overall
health information architecture.
The journey through the technical world of HIPAA (and an apparently unlimited
collection of acronyms) begins with HIPAA's "Administrative Simplification"
Subtitle F, wherein we discover that HIPAA was designed "to improve .. . the
efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system, by encouraging the
development of a health information system through the establishment of standards
and requirements for the electronic transmission of certain health information." I
Somewhat buried in the HIPAA statute 12 was a provision re-tasking the National
Committee on Vital and Health Statistics (NCVHS) 13 to become the primary advisory
7 See infra text accompanying note 35.
8 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, Final Rule, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164). The regulation text is available
at http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/final/PvcTxt01 .htm.
9 See AM. HOSP. ASS'N, HIPAA: PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS
STANDARDS, at http://www.aha.org/hipaa/hipaahome.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2001) (providing
documents related to HIPAA's implementation). However, note the joint letter to the Chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee from the AHA, the Federation of American Hospitals and other
hospital groups urging Congress not to delay the electronic transactions standards beyond the October
2002 compliance date. Id.
10 For a friendly yet critical analysis, see Lawrence 0. Gostin, National Health Information
Privacy. Regulations Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 285 JAMA 3015
(2001).
11 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-191, § 261,
110 Stat. 1988 (1996).
12 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-191, § 263,
110 Stat. 1988 (1996).
13 http://ncvhs.hhs.govl.
364 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 27 NO. 4 2001
group for health information policy, essentially overseeing the development of the
nation's health information systems. Pursuant to this HIPAA mandate, the NCVHS
Workgroup first published a concept paper in October 1998,14 followed by an Interim
Report in June 2000,15 which sketches the broad model for a National Health
Information Infrastructure (NHII) as "the set of technologies, standards, applications,
systems, values, and laws that support all facets of individual health, health care, and
public health." 16
The rate of progress towards a NHII has attracted negative comments from the
President's Information Technology Advisory Committee (PITAC). In its February
2001 report, the Committee noted that, "The U.S. lacks a broadly disseminated and
accepted national vision for information technology-in health care."' 17 PITAC singled
out the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) as failing to "have a
clear, strategic vision of the benefit that the department and all of its agencies could
receive from information technology research and use of information technology
tools."' 8
Although progress towards a NHII may not have been as rapid as some would
like, NCVHS has made all the right noises about protecting patient privacy and has
denied that a NHII is merely an attempt by the government to collect personal health
information. 19 Consistent with the overall thesis of this article, it is quite telling that
in listing the benefits of an NHII, NCVHS first makes reference to the reduction of
medical error: "Through the use of integrated information technologies, it is hoped
that different segments of the medical care system will be able to 'talk' to one
another better and faster, and, in the process, dramatically increase diagnostic
accuracy and spot potential errors before they injure patients." 20 This linkage has
been endorsed by PITAC, with the comment that, "Only information technology can
help us take data from records of individual care and make them available for
analysis of populations, both for the generation of new epidemiological knowledge
14 NAT'L COMM. ON VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, NHII WORKGROUP ON THE NAT'L HEALTH
INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, ASSURING A HEALTH DIMENSION FOR THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE (1998), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/hii-nii.htm.
Is NAT'L COMM. ON VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, NHII WORKGROUP ON THE NAT'L
HEALTH INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERIM REP., TOWARD A NATIONAL HEALTH INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE (2000) [hereinafter NCVHS INTERIM REP.], available at
http://ncvhs.hhs.gov/NHl12kReport.htm.
16 Id. The NCVHS INTERIM REP. continues,
The broad goal of the NHII is to deliver information to
individuals-consumers, patients, and professionals-when and where they need
it, so they can use this information to make informed decisions about health and
health care ....
The content of the NHII will be varied and complex. It includes clinical,
population, and personal data; practice guidelines; biomedical, health services,
and other research findings; and consumer health information, Currently, health
information is stored in many locations. The NHII seeks to connect that
information where links are appropriate, authorized by law and patient
permissions, and protected by security policies and mechanisms. In effect, the
content moves beyond data to information and, ultimately, to knowledge based on
analysis and experience.
Id.
17 PRESIDENT'S INFO. TECH. ADVISORY COMM., PANEL ON TRANSFORMING HEALTH CARE,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: TRANSFORMING HEALTH CARE THROUGH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 4
(2001) [hereinafter PITAC REP.], available at http://www.itrd.gov/pubs/pitac/.
18 Id. at 8.
19, See NCVHS INTERIM REP., supra note 15.
20 Id.
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and for the generation of prudent health policy." 21
The key "Administrative Simplification" component of this future NHII is the
enabling of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) for the healthcare system.
Fundamentally, EDI is the electronic exchange of standardized business documents
between what are known as "trading partners." 22 The EDI architecture envisioned by
the regulations made-or to be made-under HIPAA (hereinafter HIPAA-EDI)
requires the "use of national transaction standards when performing these business
transactions between organizations electronically [and] ... that all parties using these
transactions for healthcare follow the guidelines established by national
implementation guides." 23
The HIPAA-EDI model is highly technical, 24  but conceptually
straightforward. 25 Those healthcare entities that opt to use EDI will be required to
comply with very detailed "Transaction and Code Sets." 26 These data models are
generally third party standards 27 promulgated by organizatians such as the American
National Standards Institute's (ANSI) Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X1228
and the National Council for Prescription Drug Programs (NCPDP).29 HIPAA-EDI
defines its "trading partners" by way of "identifiers" for health plans, individuals,
healthcare providers and employers.30 When it is fully implemented,3 1 HIPAA-EDI
2i PITAC RE P., supra note 17, at 2, noting:
Advances in information technology can provide the foundation for
important improvements in health care delivery, such as more cost effective
monitoring and follow-up of patients beyond health care centers and dynamic,
optimal targeting of specific sectors of the population for special education,
screening, and early treatment where necessary. Information technology can also
help to provide better feedback loops for connecting providers, policymakers, and
patients with late-breaking research and discussions about clinical decision-
making policy.
22 See generally Jane K. Winn, XML and the Legal Foundations for Electronic Commerce:
Making XML Pay: Revising Existing Electronic Payments Law to Accommodate Innovation, 53 SMU L.
REV. 1477, 1478 (2000) (discussing the technologies underlying electronic commerce).
23 SIEMENS MED. SOLUTIONS HEALTH SERVS. CORP., HIPAA Overview, at http://www.smed.
com/hipaa/overview.pnp (last visited Oct. 26, 2001).
24 For background, see ROY RADA, HIPAA@IT REFERENCE: HEALTH INFORMATION
TRANSACTIONS, PRIVACY, AND SECURITY 13-48 (2001).
25 Electronic data interchange (EDI) is the electronic transfer of information, such
as electronic media health claims, in a standard format between trading partners.
EDI allows entities within the health care system to exchange medical, billing,
and other information and to process transactions in a manner which is fast and
cost effective. With EDI there is a substantial reduction in handling and
processing time compared to paper, and the risk of lost paper documents is
eliminated. EDI can eliminate the inefficiencies of handling paper documents,
which will significantly reduce administrative burden, lower operating costs, and
improve overall data quality.
Id. at 21.
26 45 C.F.R. § 162.1000 (200t).
27 See D'Arcy Guerin Gue, Transactions and Code Sets: For Geeks Only?, at http://www.
hipaadvisory.com/action/tcs/geeksonly.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2001). "Transactions and Code Sets
Standards are data models that have been defined and approved by agreement of the members of
various independent organizations that focus on supporting the electronic transfer of Information." Id.
28 http://www.xl2.org (last visited Nov. 19, 2001). ANSI ASC X12N HIPAA Implementation
Guides are available from the Wash. Pub. Co., at http://hipaa.wpc-edi.com/HIPAA_40.asp (last visited
Nov. 9, 2001).
29 http://www.ncpdp.org (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
30 See Security and Electronic Signatures, 63 Fed. Reg. 43,241, 43,243 (proposed Aug. 12,
1998) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 142), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/
nprm/emplist.htm. See also Margret Amatayakul & Joan Bisterfeldt, HIPAA On The Job: Data
Mappingfor HIPAA Transactions, J. AM. HEALTH INFO. MGMT. ASS'N., Jul/Aug 2001, at 16.
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will provide for a fully interoperable, standardized system for processing all data
exchanges between healthcare entities.32
The express "Administrative Simplification" goal of HIPAA and its regulations
is the reduction of healthcare industry administrative and transaction costs. These
costs, which may account for as much as one-third of the country's annual $1 trillion
healthcare expenditures, are "backend" administrative costs associated with billing,
reimbursement, insurance claims and prescription fulfillment. 33 HIPAA seeks to
eliminate 10% or more of these costs by moving the industry to fully interoperable
systems for healthcare transactions and promoting efficient healthcare markets. 34
Encouraging and facilitating the relatively free flow of patient information
increases healthcare privacy costs. For the HIPAA-EDI system to be credible,
effective and fair, HIPAA limited how many of these costs could be externalized to
patients. Accordingly, DHHS has had to enter a world that is far more contentious
and politically-charged than that of identifiers and code sets. 35 The Department's
work towards assuring security and privacy for medical information has been
published as a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) for Security and Electronic
Signature Standards, 36 and, after a contentious NPRM period and some anxious
months following the change in administration, as the final Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information (PIHI). 37
31 In addition to Health Plan and Individual Identifiers, the Pharmacy and Claims Attachments
data sets and the final version of the Security standards are still open in late-2001.
32 The shorter-term "translation" of data between entities that will be required explains the
inclusion of the somewhat obscure "Health Care Clearinghouse" within the regulations.
Health care clearinghouse means a public or private entity, including a
billing service, repricing company, community health management information
system or community health information system, and "value-added" networks and
switches, that does either of the following functions:
(1) Processes or facilitates the processing of health information received from
another entity in a nonstandard format or containing nonstandard data content
into standard data elements or a standard transaction.
(2) Receives a standard transaction from another entity and processes or
facilitates the processing of health information into nonstandard format or
nonstandard data content for the receiving entity.
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2001). For an example of clearinghouse technology, see NaviMedix, at
http://www.navimedix.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
33 See Guerin Gue, supra note 27:
Until now, the country's 1500+ healthcare payers have employed a huge
variety of formats and data requirements to handle claims and other transactions.
The industry consensus has been that this lack of a single standard has created a
national transaction environment that is unwieldy, error-prone, and unnecessarily
costly. Adoption of the HIPAA-mandated TCS standards is expected to provide
"administrative simplification" to speed up and streamline business processes,
reduce errors, and lower costs.
34 Id.
35 Exceptionally, the individual identifier is somewhat controversial. Development of the
individual identifier was purposefully delayed until the protections envisioned in the PIHI regulations
were published. It is likely that the individual identifier will be the patient's social security number,
itself potentially contentious. See CAL CIV. CODE 1785.11.1(f) (West 2001) (limiting use of social
security numbers in healthcare situations). See also the Apr. 26, 1993 letter to Hillary Clinton, in her
then role as Chairperson, Health Care Reform Task Force, urging that the Social Security Number not
be used as the Health Identification Number, available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/medical/
ssn lettcr.txt.
36 Security and Electronic Signatures, 63 Fed. Reg. 43,241, 43,243 (proposed Aug. 12, 1998)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 142). The final regulation likely will deal primarily with security, while
electronic signatures likely will be placed in a separate regulation.
37 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, Final Rule, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164). See also U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND
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A. BASIC HIPAA-PIHI APPLICABILITY
The core of the PIHI regulations is the restriction or conditioning of disclosure
of health information by a broad range of "covered entities" 38 including, for example,
health, but not life, insurers. For the purposes of this article's focus on quality of care
and malpractice liability, the key group subject to the regulations is certain healthcare
providers. These providers, 39 such as hospitals and physicians, are subject to the
regulations if they "transmit any health information in electronic form in connection
with a [HIPAA-EDI transaction]." 40 As a result, providers who submit claims or
process referral authorizations electronically will be encompassed by the regulations.
The new regulations limit the disclosures affected providers may make of
"protected health information" (PHI).41 PHI includes oral42 or recorded information
that "relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an
individual" 43 and identifies or could identify the individual. 44  This will bring a
patient's medical record, billing record, email communications and a physician's
notes within the sphere of protection. Thereafter the provider may only disclose PHI
as permitted by the PIHI regulations. 45
Enforcement of the disclosure rules is accomplished primarily through
compliance systems, which require the provider to appoint a "privacy officer" and
train its staff,46 and through regulatory oversight. 47 Additionally, the individual
whose PHI is at issue (i.e., the patient and, in a few situations, a personal
representative) is given certain access and amendment rights which are discussed in
detail below. 48  Patients, however, are not given a private right of action for
unauthorized disclosures.
B. RELATING PIHI TO OTHER MEDICAL PRIVACY LAW
Media coverage and industry angst notwithstanding, HIPAA's PIHI did not
invent medical privacy law. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, "The constitutionally
protected privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters clearly
encompasses medical information and its confidentiality." 49 Federal constitutional
protections against state action exist under the Fourth Amendment and the due
HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE FOR Civ. RIGHTS, STANDARDS FOR PRIVACY OF INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE
HEALTH INFORMATION [hereinafter GUIDANCE/Q&As], available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/
finalmaster.html (last revised July 6, 2001).
38 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(1) (2001).
39 Defined in 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2001).
40 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2001).
41 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001).
42 It is assumed that oral information must be in a tangible form to be subject to the regulation;
otherwise it could not be received or created by the provider. The regulation does not seem to require
that an oral communication be recorded. This assumption seems consistent with the advice since issued
by DHHS, see infra text accompanying footnote 424.
43 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2001).
44 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001).
45 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2001). The various types of disclosure permitted and how they are
regulated is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 255 to 278.
46 45 C.F.R. § 164.530 (2001).
47 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.300-312 (2001).
48 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g) (2001). See infra text accompanying note 393.
49 Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding
that research institution violated federal privacy rights of clerical and administrative workers who were
tested for intimate medical conditions without their knowledge as part of an employee health
examination).
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process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.5 0 Furthermore, some state
constitutions provide for even more explicit privacy protections which impact
medical information.5'
Many states already provide robust privacy and security safeguards for medical
information. 52 The 1999 Georgetown Health Privacy Project study of state law found
that "[v]irtually every state has some law aimed at the confidentiality of patient
health information, but very few states have anything approaching a comprehensive
health privacy law." 53 In fact, one has to feel some sympathy for the DHHS
mandarins given the task of drafting the PIHI regulations. HIPAA-EDI is predicated
on national standards and uniformity, suggesting the need for blanket preemption of
state laws. However, the EDI-centric limitations of the federal enabling legislation
did not permit the draftspersons to reach many of the pro-privacy features of some
state laws, features that the drafters could not eschew for both political and
philosophical reasons.5 4 As a result, the unsatisfactory "more stringent" partial
preemption provision in PIHI is likely to befuddle and annoy healthcare institutions
with interstate businesses for years into the future. 55 There may be even worse to
come as state legislators are prodded by dissatisfied privacy advocates to pass statutes
that fill perceived gaps in the PIHI regulations, thereby increasing the number of non-
preempted protections.5 6
Obscured amidst the noise of federal regulations, state statutes and at least two
generations of conceptually-related uniform laws5 7 are common law protections,
specifically the tort action for breach of confidence which is recognized by a growing
number of jurisdictions.5 8 Only a few state medical privacy statutes expressly allow
50 See also United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 580 (3d Cir. 1980)
(holding that employee medical records fall within protected zone of privacy); United States v.
Sutherland, 143 F. Supp. 2d 609, 610 (W.D. Va. 2001) (holding that government cannot disclose
prescription records without giving patients a chance to object). See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152 (1973):
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line
of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v.
Botsford, the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee
of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying
contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of
that right in the First Amendment; in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments; in the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights; in the Ninth Amendment; or in the concept of
liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment (citations
omitted).
51 See, e.g., King v. State, 535 S.E.2d 492, 494 (Ga. 2000) (discusssing GA. CONST. art. I, § I,
para. 1). But see Rollins v. Ulmer, 15 P.3d 749, 750 (Alaska 2001) (finding that the registration
requirements of Alaska's medical marijuana law are constitutional).
52 See. e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 56-56.37 (West 2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 323(c)
(Michie 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-16-501 to 16-553 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
70.02.005 to.02.904 (West 2001); Wis. STAT. § 146.83 (2001).
53 JOY PRITTS ET AL., HEALTH PRIVACY PROJECT, THE STATE OF HEALTH PRIVACY: AN UNEVEN
TERRAIN (A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF STATE HEALTH PRIVACY STATUTES) 20 (1999) [hereinafter
HEALTH PRIVACY STATE REP.], available at http://www.healthprivacy.org. See also tabular data at 32-34.
54 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. eh. I 1l, § 70G (West 2001).
55 45 C.F.R. §§160.201-.205 (2001).
56 See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181 (Vernon 2001) (designed to fill the
"one-bite" marketing gap frequently cited by privacy advocates). For detail on marketing rule see infra
text accompanying note 234.
57 UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE INFORMATION ACT (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/ulc/fnact99/1980s/uhcia85.htm; PROPOSED REVISIONS OF UNIFORM HEALTH CARE INFORMATION
ACT (2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uhcia/hci06OO.htm.
58 See, e.g., Hurvitz v. Hoefflin, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Tadlock &
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for a private right of action.5 9 However, as one federal district court recently noted
about the PIHI regulations, "the Standards indicate a strong federal policy to protect
the privacy of patient medical records, and they provide guidance to the present
case." 60
Going further, a recent New York case, Doe v. Community Health Plan-Kaiser
Corp.,61 involved an alleged disclosure of confidential information by a medical
records clerk employed by the defendant HMO. The court, after considering state
statutory provisions imposing duties of unauthorized non-disclosure on care
providers62 and HMOs,63 concluded: "While a private cause of action may not be
predicated on ... these statutes [they] define and impose the scope of the actionable
duty of confidentiality which arises between certain health care providers ... and
their patients." 64 It is likely that state and federal privacy rules increasingly will be
used as the basis of a private right of action for breach of medical privacy.
C. BUILDING FOR QUALITY ON THE HIPAA-EDI ARCHITECTURE
It is within this environment, framed by a fledgling National Health Information
Infrastructure, the HIPAA-EDI transactional specifications and the convoluted world
of federal and state privacy regulation, that healthcare businesses must design and
build their new IT systems. In doing so, providers must respond to two interrelated
drivers. First, HIPAA-EDI will require a robust infrastructure that will facilitate the
interpretation, processing and storage of standard data sets and linked transactions in
a way that integrates institutional legacy systems and allows interoperabillity between
systems. Second, this extensive investment in IT will motivate providers to extract
additional value from the systems, to provide improvements in the quality of care
Keeney, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Anonymous v. CVS Corp., 728 N.Y.S.2d 333
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); Jeffrey H. v. Imai, Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999);
McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Berger v. Sonneland, 26 P.3d 257
(Wash. 2001).
59 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 146.84(c) (2001) ("An individual may bring an action to enjoin any
violation of § 146.82 or 146.83 or to compel compliance with § 146.82 or 146.83 and may, in the same
action, seek damages as provided in this subsection."). See also CAL. CiV. CODE § 56.35 (West 2001);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 323(c) (Michie 2001).
60 United States v. Sutherland, 143 F. Supp. 2d 609, 612 (W.D. Va. 2001).
61 709 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
62 Unless the patient waives the privilege, a person authorized to practice medicine,
registered professional nursing, licensed practical nursing, dentistry, podiatry or
chiropractic shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in
attending a patient in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable
him to act in that capacity. The relatienship of a physician and patient shall exist
between a medical corporation, as defined in article forty-four of the public
health law, a professional service corporation organized under article fifteen of
the business corporation law to practice medicine, a university faculty practice
corporation organized under section fourteen hundred twelve of the not-for-profit
corporation law to practice medicine or dentistry, and the patients to whom they
respectively render professional medical services.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4504(a) (2001).
63 Unless the patient waives the right of confidentiality, a health maintenance
organization or its comprehensive health services plan shall not be allowed to
disclose any information which was acquired by such organization or plan in the
course of the rendering to a patient of professional services by a person
authorized to practice medicine, registered professional nursing, licensed
practical nursing, or dentistry, and which was necessary to acquire to enable such
person to act in that capacity.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4410(2) (2001).
64 Doe, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 217-18.
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through patient-oriented process re-engineering such as the development of
Computerized Patient Record systems (CPR) and to leverage the new architecture by
offering innovative eHealth products.
Below, these technologies are discussed more closely in the context of the
specific legal issues they impact. 65 This section, however, will note some of the core
technologies, from the CPR to Web-based services that will be constructed on, or in
close parallel to, the HIPAA-EDI structure.
It is important to remember that the PIHI regulations apply to "protected health
information" 66 which is "created or received" 67 by the institution or individual care
provider. HIPAA-EDI neither regulates by reference to a CPR-whether or not
comprehensive in form-nor expressly calls for the adoption of CPR systems.
Accordingly, in the short term at least, a patient's PHI likely will be spread across
many systems and various CPRs. Further, some of a patient's medical records will be
in discrete unregulated systems because of quirks in the PIHI regulations' complex
definitional structure (i.e., paper records held by the quintessential rural physician
who only accepts cash). This article, however, projects somewhat beyond the
systems still used by many if not most providers today. Rather, it adopts Gostin's
description of patient-based longitudinal health records as "patient-specific records in
automated form containing all data relevant to the health of an individual (i.e.,
clinical, financial and research-oriented information, including diagnostic images)
collected over a lifetime." 68 Thus, it is assumed that, prompted by the HIPAA-EDI
architecture and other forces discussed herein, providers will adopt cohesive,
comprehensive CPR systems. Henceforth, this article uses the somewhat inaccurate
singular form for CPR, including within that concept multiple, but interoperable and
interlinked CPRs.
If HIPAA-EDI is on its face CPR-agnostic, entities such as the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and CPRI-HOST69 are prodding the
industry firmly in the direction of the longitudinal health record. There is no
standardized format for a CPR, although there is broad agreement that such a record
would contain, "1. Integrated view of patient data, 2. Access to knowledge resources,
3. Physician order entry and clinician data entry, 4. Integrated communications
support, and 5. Clinical decision support." 70 Courtesy of HIPAA-EDI, we now also
know the identifiers and data sets that will populate the CPR and make it truly
interoperable, such that medical records data can flow smoothly in from and out to
external sources such as a doctor's office, a pharmacy or a payer. 71
Integrated into these transactional systems will be sophisticated data tracking
and analysis tools. These will support the flow of the myriad reports and records
65 For example, consider physician order entry, discussed at text accompanying infra notes
125-34, and the CPR at infra text accompanying notes 373-409.
66 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001).
67 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2001).
68 Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 458 (1995)
(reference omitted).
69 http://www.cpri-host.org/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2001).
70 PAUL C. TANG & W. ED HAMMOND, A Progress Report on Computer-Based Patient Records
in the United States, in THE COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD: AN ESSENTIAL TECHNOLOGY FOR
HEALTH CARE 1 (1997). See also COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD INST., CPRI WORK GROUP ON
CPR DESCRIPTION, COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD DESCRIPTION OF CONTENT (1996), available
at http://www.cpri-host.org/resource/docs/content.html.
71 See, for example, the systems being installed by Perot Systems, at http://www.perotsystems.
com (last visited Oct. 31, 2001).
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required to be submitted by healthcare institutions. 72  In addition, patients will
participate in these systems; ordering everything from their choice of meals when
hospitalized, requesting referrals, prescription refills and scheduling outpatient
appointments. Patients will also provide feedback to the institution and payers
regarding the quality of care they received. 73 The vision of the PITAC is worthy of
note:
Decision-support tools can provide critical links between a
current patient's condition and previous clinical studies. Existing
systems largely focus on detecting errors at the source, through
such methods as range checking, alerts, and reminders, or post-hoc
quality monitoring and review. While these types of systems are
vital components for improving quality of care, important
information is often unavailable or inaccessible because it is spread
across multiple information systems and/or organizations with
differing systems. This can result in poor coordination of care and
increased illness and mortality. The challenge of going beyond
these approaches to ones that proactively foster best practices will
require efforts in the following areas:
* Expanding the range and granularity of routinely
captured data.
* Standardizing terminology.
* Developing robust techniques for incorporating new data
types into existing clinical data repositories, e.g., images
and patient genotype.
* Organizing and collecting large-scale databases to
determine best practices.
* Developing guidelines based on such evidence.
* Implementing guidelines so that they are usable
effectively at the point of care, including embedded
decision support that is continually updated as new
evidence accumulates.
Reducing the cost and difficulty of integrating applications
that reside on heterogeneous technologies. 74
The critical reader may object that some of the scenarios, technologies and
business models discussed in this article have, at most, a quite tenuous link to the
PIHI regulations or even to the HIPAA-EDI model. 75 Patient privacy is a major
72 See. e.g., U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE & NAT'L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN., REPORT TO
CONGRESS: ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT, SECTION 105(A)
(2001) (discussing the effectiveness of electronic mail in the delivery of records), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/ntiageneral/esign/105a/esignl 05a.htm.
73 See generally Press Release, BLUE CROSS OF CAL., Blue Cross of California Announces
Restructured Physician Quality Initiatives, July 10, 2001, available at http://www.bluecrossca.com/
aboutus.asp. See also Milt Freudenheim, In a Shift, an H.M.O. Rewards Doctors for Quality Care, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11,2001, at Cl.
74 PITAC REP., supra note 17, at 6-7.
75 See, e.g., Jeff Mildon & Todd Cohen, Drivers in the Electronic Medical Records Market,
HEALTH MGMT. TECH., May 2001, at 14 (detailing the many reasons behind the adoption of electronic
records).
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selling point, however, and the highly visible PIHI protections will boost consumer
confidence in technologically-mediated healthcare-notwithstanding that PIHI will
apply to only a fraction of them. 7 6 With 63% of American adults now going online,
compared to 39% in 1998,77 the bricks-and-mortar healthcare industry will endeavor
not to miss the burgeoning online market. Elsewhere I have argued that "e-Health is
premised on a fundamentally new patient experience that is unconstrained by familiar
points of entry and structures or traditional channels for delivering information." 78
Providers will respond to that fundamental change: they will cease equating eHealth
to the narrow concept of telemedicine, and along with the entrepreneurs who survive
the dot.com meltdown, will build the next generation of healthcare services.7 9
Providers already embrace new business-to-business (B2B) services such as
procurement and related e-marketplaces.0 Business-to-consumer (B2C) eHealth
services will rapidly grow beyond vertical portals such as WebMD8I and spawn
treatment auctions,8 2 group-buying services8 3 and sites that match patients to clinical
trials.84 The emerging health industry IT architecture will interface with increasingly
sophisticated consumer product and Web-service hybrids, such as Web-connected
medical monitoring appliances,85 Palm-based EKG monitors8 6 or diagnosis-enabled
cell phones that locate imperiled patients via Global Positioning Systems (GPS).87
These will enable remote diagnosis, monitoring, and even treatment, while soon
interfacing with implanted chips that deliver prescription medicines.88
Most discussions of HIPAA-EDI, and specifically the PIHI regulations,
concentrate on what is prohibited. However, HIPAA-EDI is just as important for
what it enables and promotes. While publicly complaining about compliance costs,
providers-at least institutional ones-favor the basic HIPAA-EDI structure and
76 For example, very few Web-based medical advice sites will be covered by PIHI.
77 Amy Harmon, Survey About Accountability Online, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2001, at C I (citing
a Markle Foundation survey of the American public's views of Internet accountability and regulation).
78 Terry, supra note 6, at 605.
79 See generally FIRST CONSULTING GROUP, WHERE WILL THE ROAD TO E-HEALTH LEAD? TEN
E-HEALTH TRENDS 2 (2000) ("condensing" changes in the cHealth market to ten trends), at
http://www.fcg.com/knowledge/firstreports.asp.
80 See, e.g., MEDIBUY, at http://medibuy.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2001); MEDUNITE, at
http://www.medunite.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
81 http://www.webmd.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
82 See, e.g., MEDICINE ONLINE, Bid for Surgery, at http://www.medicineonline.com/
bidforsurgery (last visited Nov. 10, 2001 ).
83 See, e.g., HEALTH MARKET, at http://www.healthmarket.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2001);
HEALTH ALLIES, at http://www.healthallies.com (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
84 See. e.g., ACURIAN, at http://www.acurian.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2001);
CENTERWATCH. Clinical Trials Listing Service, at http://www.centerwatch.com/ (last visited Nov. 10,
2001).
85 See, for example, Panasonic's Tele Homecare system, at http://www.panasonic.com/
telecare/:
Panasonic created the Tele Homecare system to provide healthcare
practitioners with a way to monitor, and provide care and education to patients in
their homes. Using telecommunications technology, such as the Internet, the Tele
Homecare system allows healtheare providers to communicate with chronically
ill patients as frequently as necessary, while costing less than in-home care.
Id. For patient monitoring products, including the "LifeShirt," see also VivoMetrics, at
http://www.vivometrics.com/home.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
86 See, for example, the ActiveECG system, at http://www.activecenter.com (last visited Nov.
10, 2001).
87 See, for example, the Vitaphone, at http://www.vitaphone.de/index_e.htm (last visited Nov.
10, 2001).
88 See, e.g., MicroCHIPS, Inc., at bttp://www.mchips.com/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
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promise of cost reduction.8 9 Forward-thinking providers likely will view the HIPAA-
EDI mandate as an opportunity to re-engineer their systems to feature elaborate data
collection and analysis mechanisms that are interoperable with the systems of other
healthcare entities and, at their core, feature a highly sophisticated CPR. The
remainder of this article examines how these systems and the specifics of our new
world of privacy protection will conspire in an effort to reduce medical error and
reshape aspects of malpractice litigation.
III. REDUCING MEDICAL ERROR THROUGH TECHNOLOGY
As discussed above, protecting patient privacy and reducing medical error are
inextricably linked by technological growth and process reform. This linkage is a
worldwide phenomenon and occurs at many levels-both philosophical and
functional, commercial and technological. 90  The technology that directly or
indirectly is required by the architecture of HIPAA-EDI will hasten, even jump-start,
process reform and the development of the overall healthcare information
infrastiucture. In addition, it will accelerate the acceptance of technological solutions
by healthcare professionals, hastening technologically-mediated quality
improvement. As Stanf has observed, "Broadly speaking, quality has two
dimensions: (1) the objective, technical aspects of care (the accuracy of diagnosis
and effectiveness of treatment), and (2) service and patient satisfaction. "9 1 While
Starr argues that "[t]he impact of the digital revolution on customer service and
patient satisfaction may be equally important,"92 he concedes that "[m]ost of the
discussion about IT and quality has focused on the development of outcomes
measures for improving the technical dimension of care," while observing that "[n]ew
knowledge about outcomes should improve not only clinical judgment but also
organizational processes, reducing mistakes and iatrogenic disease." 93
A. MEDICAL AND MEDICATION ERROR
Our contemporary understanding of medical and medication error owes much to
89 See Guerin Gue, supra note 27.
90 See, for example, the Final Report of the National Expert Advisory Group on Safety and
Quality in Australian Healthcare (1999) (leading to the formation of the Australian Council for Safety
and Quality in Health Care), available at http://www.health.gov.au/hsdd/nhpq/pubs/qualsyn/
neagsyn.htm. See also Press Release, COMMONWEALTH DEP'T HEALTH AND AGED CARE, Minister
Launches Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care, Jan. 21 2000, available at
http://www.dhac.gov.au/mediarel/yr2000/mw/mw2OOO3.htm; NAT'L HEALTH PRIORITIES AND QUALITY
BRANCH, COMMONWEALTH DEP'T HEALTH AND AGED CARE, National Safety and Quality Activities
Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care, at http://
www.health.gov.ati/hsdd/nhpq/quality/natsafet.htm (last modified Feb. 17, 2000); Ross McL Wilson et
al., An Analysis of the Causes ofAdverse Events from the Quality in Australian Health Care Study, 170
MED. J. AUST'L. 411 (1999). In a similar time frame, both the Commonwealth and states have moved
to increase the level of privacy protection. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE FED. PRIVACY COMMISSIONER,
GUIDELINES ON PRIVACY IN THE PRIVATE HEALTH SECTOR, (2001), available at
http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications; Privacy Amendment (Privacy Sector) Bill 2000 (Summary)
(amending the Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988), available at http://www.law.gov.au/privaey/
billinfo.html; Health Records Bill 2000/2001 (Victoria), available at http://www.dms.dpc.vic.gov.au/
pdocs/bills/B00756/B007561.html.
91 Paul Starr, Health Care Reform and the New Economy, HEALTH AFF., Nov./Dec. 2000, at 23,
27.
92 Id. at 28.
93 Id.
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the legacy of the Harvard Study.94 The current discourse, however, must be dated to
the November 1999 publication by the IOM of To Err Is Human: Building a Safer
Health System, 95 which garnered headlines nationwide. The report is a
comprehensive exposition of adverse events and iatrogenic 96 injuries, particularly
those caused by error. To Err Is Human will always be known for its oft-quoted
statistic that "at least 44,000 Americans die each year as a result of medical errors," 97
making medical error the eighth leading cause of death, ahead of motor vehicle
accidents, breast cancer or AIDS.98 The IOM report bracketed the medical error
phenomenon by also noting that "the results of the New York Study suggest the
number may be as high as 98,000." 99 Not surprisingly, both the methodologies
behind these studies and the extrapolations built upon them have already attracted
criticisms. 100
Medical and medication errors are, of course, merely distributionally-loaded
subsets of the universe of adverse events, while negligent or malpractice-related
events are a subset of those medical and medication errors. The IOM report defines
its terms as follows:
An error is ... the failure of a planned action to be completed
as intended (i.e., error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan to
achieve an aim (i.e., error of planning).
An adverse event is an injury caused by medical management
rather than the underlying condition of the patient.
An adverse event attributable to error is a "preventable adverse
event." Negligent adverse events represent a subset of preventable
adverse events that satisfy legal criteria used in determining
negligence .... 101
In addition, the IOM report estimated that medication errors account for over
7,000 deaths annually. 102 As defined by the National Coordinating Council for
Medication Error Reporting and Prevention (NCC MERP)103 a medication error is
"any preventable event that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or
patient harm while the medication is in the control of the health care professional,
94 Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized
Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study 1, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991); Lucian
L. Leape et al., The Nature of Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical
Practice Study 11, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 377 (1991).
95 COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN:
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda Kohn et al., eds. 1999) [hereinafter TO ERR Is HUMAN].
96 Induced inadvertently by the medical treatment or procedures or activity of a
physician. Originally applied to disorders induced in the patient by
autosuggestion based on the physician's examination, manner or discussion, the
term is now applied to any adverse condition in a patient occurring as the result
of treatment by a physician or surgeon, especially to infections acquired by the
patient during the course of treatment.
See ON-LINE MEDICAL DICTIONARY, at http://www.graylab.ac.uk/omd/index.html.
97 TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 95, at 1.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100. See. e.g., Rodney A. Hayward & Timothy P. Hofer, Estimating Hospital Deaths Due to
Medical Errors: Preventability Is in the Eye of the Reviewer, 286 JAMA 415 (2001).




patient or consumer." 104 According to AHRQ, "Adverse drug events (ADEs) result
in more than 770,000 injuries and deaths each year,"105 while medication errors are a
"frequent cause" of medication-related adverse events. 10 6  AHRQ's synthesized
research suggests that "28 percent to 95 percent of ADEs can be prevented by
reducing medication errors through computerized medication systems" and that
"[c]omputerized medication order entry has the potential to prevent an estimated 84
percent of dose, frequency and route errors." 10 7
Beyond the "44,000 deaths" sound byte, however, the long-term contribution of
To Err Is Human is its emphasis on process-based solutions. Reason explains the
core concepts as follows:
The basic premise in the system approach is that humans are
fallible and errors are to be expected, even in the best organisations.
Errors are seen as consequences rather than causes, having their
origins not so much in the perversity of human nature as in
"upstream" systemic factors. These include recurrent error traps in
the workplace and the organisational processes that give rise to
them. Countermeasures are based on the assumption that though
we cannot change the human condition, we can change the
conditions under which humans work. ' 08
Leape appropriately cautions us that "[t]he systems approach is not a substitute
for either responsibility or professional judgment."' 109 Equally, he is on point with the
comment that "Neither the medical paradigm of training, testing, and blaming, nor
the legal paradigm of tort redress has succeeded.""10 The sorry sight of the President
and Congress wrangling over whether HMOs should be sued in state or federal
courts I should serve as an apt metaphor for the near bankruptcy of our traditional
approaches to improving the quality of care. Process reform is where regulatory
energies and investment dollars will be concentrated over the next decade and,
increasingly, our concept of process reform will merge with the healthcare industry's
growing appetite for information technologies.
104 Such events may be related to professional practice, health care products,
procedures and systems, including prescribing; order communications; product
labeling, packaging and nomenclature; compounding; dispensing; distribution;
administration; education; monitoring; and use.
Id. See also NCC MERP, TAXONOMY OF MEDICATION ERRORS, at http://www.nccmerp.org.
105 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, Pub. No. 01-0020, REDUCING AND
PREVENTING ADVERSE DRUG EVENTS TO DECREASE HOSPITAL COSTS (2001) [hereinafter AHRQ REP.],
available at http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/aderia/aderia.htm. See also Press Release, U.S.
PHARMACOPOEIA, USP Releases First Report on Medication Errors, Dec. 13, 2000, available at
http://www.onlinepressroom.net/uspharm (discussing U.S. Pharmacopoeia report, Summary of 1999
Information Submitted to MedMARxSM: A National Database for Hospital Medication Error
Reporting).
106 AHRQ REP., supra note 105.
107 Id. See also Assoc. Press, Computers Could Catch Medication Errors, U.S. says, ARIZ. REP.,
Apr. 12, 2001, at A9.
108 James Reason, Human Error: Models and Management, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 768, 768 (2000).
109 Lucian L. Leape, Foreword: Preventing Medical Accidents: Is "Systems Analysis'" the
Answer?, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 147 (2001).
110 Id. at 148.
III See, e.g., Status of Patients 'Rights Bill is Debated, N.Y. TIMES, at http://www.nytimes.com/
2001/07/31 /politics/31 WIRE-PATIENTS.html (July 31, 2001). See also Robert Pear, Key Lawmaker is
Reported Near Deal with Bush on Rights Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2001, at A17.
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B. COMBATING MEDICAL ERROR WITH TECHNOLOGY
With considerably less publicity than that generated by To Err Is Human, the
IOM subsequently released a report from the same Committee on the Quality of
Health Care in America. The 2001 report, Crossing the Quality Chasm.- A New
Health System for the 21st Century, 12 noted "the absence of real progress towards
restructuring health care systems to address both quality and cost concerns, or toward
applying advances in information technology (IT) to improve administrative and
clinical processes."' 13 This second report devotes an entire chapter to the relationship
between technology and quality of care. it notes:
IT has enormous potential to improve the quality of health care ....
In the area of safety, there is growing evidence that automated order
entry systems can reduce errors in drug prescribing and dosing ....
In the area of effectiveness, there is considerable evidence that
automated reminder systems improve compliance with clinical
practice guidelines . . . There are many opportunities to use IT to
make care more patient-centered, for example, by facilitating access
to clinical knowledge through understandable and reliable Web sites
and online support groups ... customized health education ... and
the use of clinical decision support systems .... Both patients and
clinicians can benefit from improvements in timeliness through the
use of Internet-based communications (i.e., e-visits, telemedicine)
and immediate access to automated clinical information, diagnostic
tests, and treatment results. . . .Clinical decision support systems
have been shown to improve efficiency by reducing redundant
laboratory tests. Finally, Intemet-based health communication can
enhance equity by providing a broader array of options for interacting
with clinicians .... 114
Fueled by technological innovation, even the most traditional practice will not
be impervious to this revolution. All physicians will interface with sophisticated new
systems designed both to reduce "backend" administrative tasks and to positively
influence the quality of medical care. Even in traditional practice space, technology
and quality assurance will turn out to be intertwined: technology will become an
increasingly important component of risk management and quality assurance
programs, and will be used to proactively target medical error.
While legislative' 15 and regulatory"t 6 responses increasing the use of technology
are likely, and public opinion fuelled by studies such as To Err Is Human will
promote reform, most of the immediate pressure to increase technologically advanced
medical error reducing systems likely will come from accreditation agencies. The
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) has made
112 COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY
CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001).
113 Id. at 3.
114 Id. at 175-76,
115 Press Release, SEN. COMM. ON AGING, Craig Says Computerized Prescription Technology Saves
Lives, May 3, 2001, available at http://aging.senate.gov/nrOI0503.htm.
116 FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., FINAL SUMMARY OF FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION ACTION
ITEMS-DOING WHAT COUNTS FOR PATIENT SAFETY: FEDERAL ACTIONS TO REDUCE MEDICAL
ERRORS AND THEIR IMPACT (2001) (hereinafter DOING WHAT COUNTS], available at
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/MedErrors/patientsafety.htm.
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important revisions to its standards that became effective on July 1, 2001. Aimed
specifically at adverse events and medical error, the revisions underscore the Joint
Commission's requirements as to process engineering and error reporting."i7
Revisions that will implicate technology-based approaches include increasing
reporting and proactive risk-reducing systems."18 The Management of Information
Chapter has been revised to include requirements that will lead to more database-
driven risk management and error reduction systems, 119 and improvements in the
institution's knowledge-base systems.' 20
Together these various initiatives give rise to three overlapping sets of
technologies that will tend to reduce medical and medication error. They may be
loosely identified as Proactive, Interactive and Informational.
1. Proactive and Order Systems
Proactive systems will be the first to appear in quantity, and mass adoption is
likely to be rapid. The average physician likely will observe this phenomenon in
increased automation of medication, such as automated interaction alerts 121 and other
systems. 122  Electronic prescribing interfaces increasingly will neutralize the
dangers 123 associated with physicians' notoriously illegible handwriting. 124 These
computerized medication order entry or physician order entry (POE) systems' 25 will
also flag objective indications of potential error. 126 For example, the systems will
check for drug interactions, and require positive identification of both patient and
drug at the time of administration 127 using bar-code or biometric technologies. 128 The
117 JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, REVISIONS TO JOINT
COMMISSION STANDARDS IN SUPPORT OF PATIENT SAFETY AND MEDICAL/HEALTH CARE ERROR
REDUCTION (2001) [hereinafter JCAHO REVISED STANDARDS], available at
http://www.jcaho.org/standard/frptsafety.html.
118 These are primarily contained in the Leadership Chapter revisions.
119 JCAHO REVISED STANDARDS, supra note 117, at L.M.8.
120 Id. at I.M.9.
121 See, e.g., David W. Bates et al., Effect of Computerized Physician Order Entry and a Team
Intervention on Prevention of Serious Medication Errors, 280 JAMA 1311 (1998).
122 Donna Tapellini, A Wireless Doctor is in the House, WIRED NEWS, at
htlp://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,40560,00.html (Dee. 7, 2000).
123 See, e.g., JCAHO, Medication Errors Related to Potentially Dangerous Abbreviations,
SENTINEL EVENT ALERT, Sept. 2001, available at http://www.jeaho.org/edupub/sealert/sea23.html.
124 See, e.g., Theresa Agovino, Digital Rxfor Doctors'Bad Handwriting, AKRON BEACON J., June 25,
2001, available at http://www.ohio.com/all/2001/June/25/bizdocs/029130.htm; Editorial, Writing a Medical
Wrong, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 10, 2000, at A24. Non-technological approaches to dealing with this issue, such as
calligraphy and handwriting courses for doctors, are also being tried. See Janet Wells, Rxfor Doclors with
Poor Handwriting, S.F. CHRON., July 1,2001, at Al 5.
125 AHRQ REP., supra note 105.
126 Automated dispensing systems are drug storage devices or cabinets that
electronically dispense medications in a controlled fashion and track medication
use. Their principal advantage lies in permitting nurses to obtain medications for
inpatients at the point of use. Most systems require user identifiers and
passwords, and internal electronic devices track nurses accessing the system,
track the patients for whom medications are administered, and provide usage data
to the hospital's financial office for the patients' bills.
See AGENCY FOR HEALT14CARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, Pub. No. 01-E057, MAKING HEALTH CARE
SAFER: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PATIENT SAFETY PRACTICES ch. 11 (2001), available at
http://www.ahrq.gov/clinie/ptsafety.
127 See, for example, the MEDSTATION System 2000/Rx System 2000, at
http://www.pyxis.com/products/medstation2OO.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2001).
128 See SIEMENS MED. SOLUTIONS HEALTH SERVS. CORP., Siemens Medication Management
Solution: Improving Medication Safety, at http://www.smed.com/solutions/products/medmanagement/
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adoption of this last technology has been set as a priority by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). 129
Many of these functions will migrate from the bedside cart to handheld devices
(predominantly those using the Palm operating system)130 that will more frequently
be mandated by the credentialing institution.' 3' The modem, highly portable
proactive device may perhaps be best appreciated from the marketing words of one
technology supplier:
* Slip your PDA [personal digital assistant] out of your
pocket.
* Instantly access your patient's drug benefit plan and history.
* Verify patient eligibility and formulary information with the
tap of a stylus.
* Check potential drug interactions with other drugs the
patient is taking.
* Transmit accurate prescriptions to the patient's pharmacy of
choice instantly.
* All without valuable time spent by your staff on the phone.
* All with only one electronic prescribing system for all of
your patients.132
Increasingly robust data sets will flow into these devices. For example, the
existing FDA MedWatch site provides an Internet gateway for adverse event and
clinical safety reporting about over-the-counter drugs, biologics, dietary supplements
and medical devices. 133 This data will be available on the ePocrates system that
provides point-of-care information for the most commonly prescribed medications,
including specific dosing and drug interaction warnings. 134
2. Interactive, Surveillance and Expert Systems
Initially, computer monitoring or surveillance systemsI3 5-essentially smart
supplements to familiar models such as chart review-will define the interactive
structure installed by healthcare institutions. These systems monitor objective
indicia, such as change in heart or respiratory rates, and assess them by reference to
patient-specific information contained in the CPR, such as dosage and patient
index.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2001). See also Susan Lundine, Hospital Software Tracks Down
Prescription Info., ORLANDO BUS. J., Apr. 27, 2001, available at http://orlando.bcentral.com/orlando/
stories/2001/04/30/newscolumn2.html.
129 See DOING WHAT COUNTS, supra note 116. On December 3, 2001 the FDA announced that it
would develop a proposed rule requiring bar codes on all prescription drug labels. See FDA: Bar Code
Requirement for Drugs Planned as Part ofAgency Focus on Patient Safety, 6 Health Care Daily Rep.
(BNA) 232 (Dec. 5, 2001).
130 See, e.g., Milt Freudenheim, Digital Doctoring, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2001, at Cl.
131 In no large part because of accreditation pressures. See supra text accompanying note 117.
132 RxHuB.NET, at http://www.rxhub.org/sub/physician.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2001). See
also PEPID 2001, Portable Emergency and Primary Care Information Database, at
http://www.pcpid.com/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2001).
133 http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2001).
134 Press Release, EPOCRATES, FDA MedWatch Partners with ePocrates to Send Out Drug
Safety Alerts, July 17, 2001, available at http://www.epocrates.com/headlines/pressreleases.cfm.
135 This terminology is used apparently interchangeably by AHRQ. See AHRQ REP., supra note
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weight. 136 These interactive surveillance systems are architecture dependent and
closely related to privacy and security impacted or driven technologies.
Surveillance systems will only get smarter. As noted by the IOM, "with
increasing use and development of artificial intelligence systems, computer-based
patient records may be expected to become interactive, providing diagnostic
assistance and even treatment recommendations."' 137 First, the range and sources of
data they process will begin to include normative data such as clinical guidelines.
Second, their outputs will become increasingly evaluative. Information technologies
already improve clinician access to all forms of treatment-related information. Fully
interactive systems will exploit the logical intersection of diagnostic databases, 38
practice guidelines and the specific electronic patient record within "expert
systems."139 Such expert systems will feature real-time quality assurance monitoring
of the quality of care received by patients and will both aid and, in extremis, override
arguably more frail traditional human systems.140  Obviously, such systems
themselves create difficult issues, including risk-reallocation' 4' and device
regulation, and impact our understanding of unlicensed practice.14 2
3. Information and Reporting Systems
Beyond providing the operational infrastructure for proactive and interactive
systems, the new healthcare technology infrastructure will have a dramatic effect on
the quantity, flow and utility of information about medical and medication errors.
Immediately, the new health information infrastructure will increase the robustness of
peer-review-based reporting of adverse events to risk managers, disciplinary agencies
and, increasingly, to patients and prospective patients. 143 Computer surveillance
136 Id.
137 INST. OF MED., THE COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD: AN ESSENTIAL TECHNOLOGY FOR
HEALTH CARE 179 (1991) [hereinafter COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD].
138 See, for example, Thomson MICROMEDEX's UltiMedex Suite, at http://www.
micromedex.com/products/healthcare (last visited Nov. 14, 2001); MEDITECH's Patient Care System,
at http://www.meditech.com/Main/Products.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2001).
139 See, for example, the listing of medical expert systems, at http://www.computer.privateweb.
at/judith/name_3.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2001).
140 See, e.g., POEMS, Post Operative Expert Medical System, at http://www.cbl.leeds.ac.uk/
sawar/projects/poems/overview (last visited Nov. 14, 2001).
141 See generally Nicolas Terry, When the "Machine That Goes 'Ping'" Causes Harm: Default
Torts Rules and Technologically-Mediated Health Care Injuries, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming
March 2002).
142 [Tlhe interaction of such "smart" systems with computer-based patient records
will also raise a host of legal and policy issues . . . . Among them will be
allocation of responsibility (and liability) for errors in the artificial intelligence
system, whether caused by faulty hardware, faulty software, or error in the
system's medical rules. The more advanced such systems become, the more
questions they 'will generate about the practice of medicine and whether
nonphysicians can use these systems to diagnose and treat patients without
physician involvement. In addition, systems that can diagnose or treat patients
without intervening professional involvement may be classified and regulated as
medical devices under food and drug laws. Finally, these "smart" systems can be
expected to lead to a redefinition of the physician's role, as they begin to perform
functions that formerly only a physician could perform.
Id. at 179.
143 See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American
Healthcare, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1777 (1999):
In the last few years, however, synergies between continuing demand for
cost-containment and availability of new information technologies have launched
an "information revolution" among health care providers and care management
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systems will increase the quality o'f this information, particularly outcome-based data,
and will lead to an overall reversal of the trend of underreporting of adverse events.
The new technologies will also encourage the growth of hospital knowledge
bases. Although the establishment of such knowledge bases is not new, the
increasing standardization that flows from HIPAA-EDI will accelerate the trend
toward interoperability between the knowledge bases at different institutions.
Analysis required under the JCAHO Sentinel Events policy144 can be more
sophisticated given the new technologies, thus increasing the quality of information
fed into the Sentinel Event Database. This is consistent with the July 2001 JCAHO
revisions that now include "successful practices" in the list of resources to be
included in an institution's knowledge base.145 A "successful practice," something of
an inverted Sentinel Event, is related to the "Best Practices" being developed by the
Accelerating Change Today (ACT) 146 collaboration of the National Coalition on
Health Care 147 and the Institute for Healthcare Improvement. 148 The coalition has
published a series of success stories, 149 and the American Hospital Association has
published "Successful Safety Practices" culled from member activities. 150 Finally,
JCAHO itself publishes a "Sentinel Event Alert" newsletter that combines error data
and successful ameliorating practices.15 1
Similarly, there will be increased use of de-identified information culled from
all these systems. For example, AHRQ's Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project
(HCUP)152 is designed to create standardized, multi-state health databases that can be
used to perform comparative analysis on variations in medical practice and the
effectiveness of medical technology and treatments. 153
organizations directed at performance improvement. In addition, health care
purchasers have begun to appreciate the effect that shared information has on
performance. Corporate benefits departments are often active partners with
managed care organizations in quality assessment and improvement activities,
rather than merely serving as information conduits for individual enrollees. In
other words, external reporting of information is explicitly linked to internal,
often collaborative, analysis (footnotes omitted).
One of Sage's conclusions includes the observation, "Of all possible uses of disclosure, the
performance rationale is most likely to create meaningful change in the health care system, but starts
from a very different premise-ends-forcing oversight rather than consumer sovereignty." Id. at 1826.
144 JOINT COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS, SENTINEL EVENT
POLICY AND PROCEDURES, available at http://jcprdwl.jcaho.org/sentinel/sepp.html (last revised June
2, 2000). A sentinel event "is an unexpected occurrence involving death or serious physical or
psychological injury, or the risk thereof." Id.
145 JCAHO REVISED STANDARDS, supra note 117, at I.M. 9.
146 See NAT'L COALITION ON HEALTH CARE, Accelerating Change Today (A.C.T)-For
America's Health, at http://www.americashealth.org/actinitiative.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
147 http://www.nchc.org/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
148 http://www.ihi.org/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2001).
149 NAT'L COALITION ON HEALTH CARE & INST. FOR HEALTHCARE IMPROVEMENT, REDUCING
MEDICAL ERRORS AND IMPROVING PATIENT SAFETY: SUCCESS STORIES FROM THE FRONT LINES OF
MEDICINE (2000), available at http://www.nchc.org/releases/medicalrelease_2-22.htm.
150 AM. HEALTH ASS'N, Successful Safety Practices, at http://www.aha.org/medicationsafety/
SuccessfulPracticesasp (last visited Nov 17, 2001).
151 See, e.g, JCAHO, Look-Alike, Sound-Alike Drug Names, SENTINEL EVENT ALERT, May
2001, available at http://jcprdwl.jcaho.org/edu_pub/sealert/seal9.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
152 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, The Healthcare Cost and Utilization
Project, at http://www.ahrq.gov/data/hcup/hcup-pkt.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
153 For example, the Kids' Inpatient Database (KID) contains data from approximately 1.9
million hospital discharges for children, at http://www.ahrq.gov/data/hcup/hcupkid.htm (last visited
Nov. 19, 2001).
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The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA)1S4 took a two-
pronged approach to peer-review-based quality improvement. First, it promoted good
faith professional review activities by granting immunity to those engaged in certain
forms of peer-review. 155 Second, it provided for certain instances of mandatory
reporting of data likely coupled to adverse events or medical error to a National
Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB). 156 Under HCQIA, peer-review entities taking
adverse actions must report to state licensure boards. 157  Insurance companies,
provider organizations' 58 and medical licensure boards must report malpractice
payments or adverse disciplinary actions directly to the NPDB. 159 However, as the
Office of Inspector General (OIG) has noted, the level of underreporting is so
extreme as to be more properly characterized as non-reporting. 160 Recently, OIG has
also been extremely critical of the complaint process for Medicare beneficiaries, the
Medicare Utilization Quality Control Peer Review Organization Program (PRO).
According to OIG, "[t]he PROs' complaint process is an ineffective safety valve for
Medicare beneficiaries. It has improved little over the past 5 years. Its accessibility
is questionable .... It rarely triggers any intervention beyond a letter for substantiated
complaints .... It fails to provide a meaningful response to complainants."', 61
Many of the defects in our current reporting systems likely are exacerbated by
legal indeterminacies. HCQIA provides a "professional review body" with immunity
from damages whenever a "professional review action" is taken.162 Questions have
154 Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3784-3794
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1994)).
155 Christina A. Graham, Comment, Hide And Seek: Discovery in The Contexto of the State and
Federal Peer Review Privileges, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 11 1 (2000).
156 http://www.npdb.com
157 42 U.S.C. § 11133 (1994).
158 See Am. Dental Ass'n v Shalala, 3 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The ADA challenged an
DHHS regulation which required a "person or entity" to report malpractice settlement payments to a
central data bank. Id. at 446. The court held that only entities are required to report, and that the
"person" provision violated the HCQIA, under which the regulations were promulgated. Id. at 448.
159 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11132, 11134(1994).
160 See U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., Pub. No. OEI-01 -
99-00690, MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATION NONREPORTING TO THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA
BANK: A SIGNAL FOR BROADER CONCERN ii (2001). Discussing nonreporting by MCOs the OIG report
noted:
The two most likely explanations for the low level of reporting:
[1] Limited focus on clinical oversight.
Some managed care organizations devote considerable attention to the quality of
care being provided to their enrollees. But we learned that in a health care
marketplace that has been changing rapidly, many managed care organizations
devote little attention to clinical oversight.
[2] Reliance on downstream entities--hospitals, physician practice groups, and
State licensure boards--to conduct quality monitoring of practitioners...
Id.
161 U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., Pub. No. OEI-01-00-00060,
THE MEDICARE BENEFICIARY COMPLAINT PROCESS: A RUSTY SAFETY VALVE 4 (2000).
162 If a professional review action ...of a professional review body meets all the
standards specified in section 11112(a) of this title ....
(A) the professional review body... shall not be liable in damages under any law
of the United States or of any State (or political subdivision thereof) with respect
to the action.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1111 l(a)(l) (West 2001). See also Gabaldoni v. Wash. County Hosp. Ass'n, 250 F.3d
255, 260 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that hospital that had terminated physician's clinical privileges had
satisfied the preconditions for HCQIA immunity); No. Colo. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Nicholas, 2001 WL
705600, *1 (Colo. Jun 25, 2001) (holding that participants in a peer-review of a physician complied
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arisen as to the effect of this provision in the case of a malpractice action brought by
a patient against a provider for negligent credentialing. 163 A related issue concerns
the discoverability of documents examined or created during peer-review. While
there is a split in authority as to application of federal immunity under HCQIA, most
states provide for some protection of peer-review documents, 164 and have begun the
process of extending the privilege to medication error reporting. 65 Notwithstanding,
it is abundantly clear that the movement towards disclosure will only increase, 166 as
will the robustness of both criteria and resources available to private 67 and public 168
accreditation agencies. Equally, the medium for error reporting increasingly will be
the Internet.1 69
Traditionally, our peer-review and regulatory-based disclosure reporting
systems have not involved disclosure of quality of care data-absent de-
identificationI 70 -directly to the consumer. That asymmetry is likely to change,
parallel with the increase in the quality and quantity of the data being generated from
our new systems. For example, a United States District Court recently held that the
federal government's regulations and manual for PRO were invalid under the
enabling Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982,171 because they prohibited PROs'
disclosure of the disposition of a complaint investigation if that information identified
a practitioner who does not consent to disclosure. 72 As already noted, the 2001
revisions to the JCAHO standards place particular and additional emphasis on
information technologies.173 The revised Patient Rights and Organization Ethics
with HCQIA and were immune from contract and tort claims in the state court).
163 Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting in any manner the rights
and remedies afforded patients under any provision of Federal or State law to
seek redress for any harm or injury suffered as a result of negligent treatment or
care by any physician, health care practitioner, or health care entity, or as limiting
any defenses or immunities available to any physician, health care practitioner, or
health care entity.
42 U.S.C. § III15(d) (1994). See, e.g., St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503,.509
(Tex. 1997) (holding that a state statute providing for immunity for provider credentialing decisions
applied not only to actions by physicians, but also to patient actions notwithstanding incorporation of
HCQIA into Texas statute).
164 See Graham, supra note 155, at 125.
165 See Press Release, U.S. PHARMACOPOEIA, USP Granted Legal Protection for Medication
Error Reporting in Oklahoma, May 8, 2001, available at http://www.onlinepressroom.net/uspharm.
166 See Sage, supra note 144, at 1704 ("[Olne regulatory strategy has emerged as a favored
approach of disparate constituencies: expanding the amount of information about the health care
system circulating among consumers, providers, and voters.").
167 See, e.g., NAT'L COMM. FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE (NCQA), at http://www.ncqa.org (providing
both accreditation and performance measurement for MCOs). See generally John K. Iglehart, The National
Committeefor Quality Assurance, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 995, 995 (1996) ("The NCQA accredits managed-
care plans that voluntarily request a review of their operations and develops performance measures for plans
through the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS), the most prominent of recent private
efforts to develop, collect, standardize, and report measures of plan performance."). See also AM.
ACCREDITATION HEALTHCARE/COMMISSION (URAC), at http://www.urac.org.
168 See, e.g., Medicare Program; Establishment of the Medicare+Choice Program, 63 Fed. Reg.
34,968, 34,989 (1998) (incorporating the "Quality Improvement System for Managed Care" (QISMC)
standards requiring health plans both to possess quality assessment capabilities and to establish and
meet performance improvement goals). See also HCFA, Quality of Care - National Projects, Quality
Improvement System for Managed Care (QISMC), at http://www.hcfa.gov/quality/3a.htm.
169 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.61(5) (West 2001).
170 See, e.g.,42 U.S.C.A. § 11137 (West 2001).
171 Peer Review Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.97-248, 96 Stat. 381 (1982) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c to 1320c-22 (1994)).
172 Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Dep't Health and Human Servs., 151 F. Supp. 2d 64, 66 (D.D.C. 2001).
173 See supra text accompanying notes 117-120.
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Chapter, however, includes the more controversial requirement that, "Patients and,
when appropriate, their families are informed about the outcomes of care, including
unanticipated outcomes. 1' 74
As discussed in Part VI, this direct error reporting reinforced by technology's
positive impact on patient-incurred information costs, will have a substantial impact
on malpractice litigation: by removing some of the false negatives inherent in our
current system, increased error reporting and related quality data will change the
level of risk reallocation performed by the torts system.175  Such a disclosure
obligation should also effectively increase deterrence once providers know they will
have to confront their patients or next-of-kin. In a more haphazard fashion, such
information is also likely to filter out to the media and have some marginal effect on
consumer choice, while increasing the likelihood of identifying and then
rehabilitating the problem doctors. 76
The hungriest consumers for the medical error data generated by the providers'
new information technologies and facilitated by increasing error-reporting
requirements will be information intermediaries or "infomediaries." Healthcare is a
credence good and the health industry has very little credibility of its own. 177 As a
result, consumers will turn to third parties who can deliver to them relevant
information without exorbitant sorting costs. Conventional media outlets have
already shown an appetite for this type of data. For example, the U.S. News
"Hospital Rankings" utilizes both subjective reputation data and objective mortality
rates. 178 Beyond the conventional media outlets, the Internet has already proved itself
to be the most voracious consumer of information that can influence consumer
choice, and increasingly the robust data flowing from providers will find a home on
the Web. 79 For example, the epinion.com service already collates the views of
consumers on health and wellness products including OTC drugs, and
PatientWise.net enables patients to evaluate their own medical needs in the context of
potential providers' experience, complication rates, and mortality rates in similar
cases.'80 The WebMD "Find a Doctor" service is approaching this model from a
slightly different direction, providing Web space for doctors and encouraging patients
to provide recommendations and other feedback. 181 And the California Healthcare
Foundation's PEP-C Report, "What Patients Think of California Hospitals," is to be
found in all its detail on the web. 182
Increasingly the ranks of infomediaries will include government regulators. For
example, the federal government Web-publishes "Nursing Home Compare,"183 and
174 JCAHO REVISED STANDARDS, supra note 117, at RI.l.2.2.
175 See infra text accompanying note 365.
176 See, e.g., Abagail Zuger, A Program's Goal: Evaluate and Rehabilitate Problem Doctors,
N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2001, at F5 (discussing the Institute for Physician Evaluation).
177 HARRIS INTERACTIVE, Consumer Backlash Against Managed Care and Pharmaceutical
Industries-Bottomed out or in Remission?, HEALTH CARE NEWS, May 29, 2001, available at
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/newsletters_healthcare.asp.
178 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., America's Best Hospitals, July 23, 2001, available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/nycu/health/hosptl/tophosp.htm. See also SUN. TIMES, Sun. Times
Good Hospital Guide, Jan. 14, 2001, at http://www.sunday-times.co.uk/.
179 http://www.epinions.com/healthbeauty/tk_-HPOO1.1.56 (last visited Nov. 14, 2001).
180 http://www.patientwise.net (last visited Nov. 14, 2001)
181 http://my.webmd.com/find_a_phys/doctor (last visited Nov. 14, 2001).
182 CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., WHAT PATIENTS THINK OF CALIFORNIA HOSPITALS (2001),
available at http://hospitalguide.chcf.org.
183 U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
Nursing Home Compare, at http://www.medicare.gov/NHCompare/Home.asp (last visited Nov. 27,
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some states already Web-publish institutional quality rankings, 184 and physician
profiles.185 Finally, a system to rate physicians is on the Medicare-reform agenda.18 6
Overall, the new IT architecture that is so fundamental to HIPAA-EDI and its
privacy and security correlates will dramatically increase the likelihood that
information about medical error will be disclosed and comprehensively analyzed. As
we build increasingly sophisticated proactive and interactive error-reducing systems
on and around the HIPAA-EDI infrastructure, this complex bundle of technologies,
and the traction now enjoyed by ever-evolving public and private disclosure systems,
will reshape our understanding of medical error and accelerate its amelioration. This
linkage between privacy and medical -error is less an example of the rule of
unintended consequences and more a function of the inherent synergies between
HIPAA-EDI transactions and IT-led process reform. In the sections that follow,
however, this article observes several intersections between privacy regulation and
malpractice law and practice that are less likely to have been intended by the
architects of modern health privacy.
IV. THE IMPACT OF PRIVACY REGULATION AND EHEALTH ON
SUBSTANTIVE MALPRACTICE LAW
Privacy regulation and the architecture around which it is developing affects
traditional malpractice law in three important areas. First, the disclosure rules and
systems that they contemplate will have spill-over effects on informed consent.
Second, a robust CPR and patient access to it will impact the malpractice litigation
process and the resolution of claims. The third area concerns the likelihood of
2001 ). Testifying before a Senate Subcommittee, a high-ranking DHHS official recently described this
as follows:
The primary purpose of this database is to provide information about the
performance of approximately 17,000 Medicare- and Medicaid-certified nursing
homes across the country. The database has detailed information gathered from
the States that conduct surveys and certify the facilities, including whether any
quality deficiencies were found, and how severe they were. Furthermore, it has
characteristics of the nursing home residents, including the percentage of
residents with pressure sores, percentage of residents with urinary incontinence,
and more.
Using Technology to Improve Medicare Before the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Subcomm. on Sci.. Tech.
and Space, 107th Cong. 4 (2001) (statement of Tom Scully, Admin., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs.).
184 See, e.g., MD. HEALTH CARE COMM'N, Maryland Nursing Home Performance Evaluation
Guide, at http://209.219.237.235 (last visited Nov. 18, 2001). In England, see NAT'L HEALTH SERV.,
DEP'T OF HEALTH, NHS Performance Ratings, at http://www.doh.gov.uk/performanceratings/index.
html (last visited Nov. 18, 2001).
185 See, e.g., MASS. BOARD OF REGISTRATION IN MED., Massachusetts Board of Registration,
Medicine Physician Profile System, at http://www.docboard.org/ma/df/masearch.htm (last visited Nov.
14, 2001); FLA. DEP'T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., Medical Quality Assurance. Practitioner
Profiling, at http://www.doh.state.fl.us/mqa/Profiling/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2001); VA.
BOARD OF MED., VIRGINIA BOARD OF MEDICINE PRACTITIONER INFORMATION, at
http://www.vahealthproviders.com/index.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2001). Such publication is,
however, controversial. See, e.g., Sandra G. Boodman, New Tech, Old Politics; Virginia Doctors Block
Web Access to Data Available by Phone, Mail, WASH. POST, July 31, 2001 at FOI; Tammie Smith, Web
Site About Doctors Scrutinized, Disciplinary Data Curbs are Sought, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
July 11,2001, at B3.
186 Julie Appleby, Medicare Overhaul Could Include Ratings: Officials Consider Requiring
Hotly Debated Quality Reports on Health Providers, USA TODAY, June 6, 2001, at 1B (noting the
controversial speech by Thomas Scully, head of CMS). In England, government regulators publish
information about hygiene in public hospitals. See Lorna Duckworth & Thomas Bell, Hit Squads Sent
in to Clean up Squalid Hospitals, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 11, 2001, at 6.
AN eHEALTH DIPTYCH
substantive changes to malpractice law to reflect changes in the practice of medicine
brought about by the HIPAA-EDI infrastructure.
The substantive changes to malpractice law that are dealt with in this Part
involve three phenomena: the interplay between the utilization of information
technologies and the standard of care used in malpractice cases; the manner in which
new business models adopted by traditional, bricks-and-mortar healthcare institutions
impacts their legal liability; and the difficulties inherent in applying malpractice-like
liability models to B2B eHealth entities such as medical advice sites.
It should be added that one action against a healthcare institution or individual
care provider that is not discussed in this section is that of breach of confidentiality or
other disclosure of private medical information. As discussed above, the PIHI rules
do not provide for a private right of action, although it is well within the wit of a
plaintiff to construct an action at common law that references federal and state
disclosure standards.18 7  Equally, the plaintiffs bar will swiftly become more
conversant in informational wrongs, national and local privacy standards and the
myriad of ways that a provider can run afoul of them. Accordingly, it is not unlikely
that a breach of privacy allegation will become a standard count in a malpractice
complaint, just as duty to warn counts now routinely turn up in products liability
actions188 and as informed consent counts are used to buttress lackluster surgical or
medication cases. t89 Furthermore, it is likely that plaintiffs will use any knowledge
they have of provider non-compliance with PIHI regulations-with all the penalty
ramifications that brings-as leverage in settlement negotiations in tangentially
related malpractice cases.
A. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND THE STANDARD OF CARE
As discussed above, 190 the data contained in practice guidelines will
increasingly be incorporated in error-reducing expert systems as healthcare entities
build interfaces between their knowledge bases and computer surveillance systems.
Even prior to such sophisticated integration, practice and clinical guidelines and their
fellow travelers, such as evidence-based medicine and clinical pathways, will impact
the standard of care.
Driven internationally by the Cochrane Collaboration, 19 and by AHRQ in the
United States,192 evidence-based medicine is "the conscientious, explicit, and
judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of
individual patients. The practice of evidence-based medicine means integrating
individual clinical expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from
systematic research." 193 As noted by Sackett:
187 See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
188 For a broad-ranging discussion of the role and reach of modern warning doctrine, see
generally Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347 (Cal. 1996). See also Nicolas P. Terry, Collapsing
Torts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 717, 757 n.197 (1993).
189 See discussion of "bad" cases infra text accompanying note 290.
190 See supra text accompanying note 135.
191 http://www.cochrane.org (last visited Nov. 17, 2001). See also David L. Sackett, Letter,
Cochrane Collaboration, 309 BRIT. MED. J. 1514; Mark R. Wormald & Katherine Oldfield, Evidence
Based Medicine, the Cochrane Collaboration, and the CONSORTStatement, 82 BRIT. J. OPHTHALMOL.
597 (1998).
192 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, Evidence-based Practice, at
http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/epcix.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2001).
193 David L Sackett et al., Editorial, Evidence Based Medicine: What It is and Whatlt Isn't, 312
BRIT. MED. J. 71,71 (1996).
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Good doctors use both individual clinical expertise and the best
available external evidence, and neither alone is enough. Without
clinical expertise, practice risks becoming tyrannised by evidence,
for even excellent external evidence may be inapplicable to or
inappropriate for an individual patient. Without current best
evidence, practice risks becoming rapidly out of date, to the
detriment of patients. 194
Evidence-based medicine, whatever its disclaimers and limitations, hints at best
practices. Practice or clinical guidelines, however, are quite explicit. Guidelines are
generally available on the Web through the National Guideline Clearinghouse,' 95
Medscape, 196 AHRQ,197 medical specialty organizations' 98 and other content
aggregators. 199 When incorporated into more traditional biomedical texts, guidelines
are accessible through MEDLINE at the U.S. National Library of Medicine. 200 The
"best practices" normative quality of practice guidelines will be reinforced through
the increased availability and dispersal of reports of successful practices both inside a
hospital and between institutions. 201  In many cases, institutions will take the
initiative and convert such data into explicit norms by adopting clinical pathways. 202
Unfortunately, as pointed out by Feder, "[t]he development of good guidelines
does not ensure their use in practice. Systematic reviews of strategies for changing
professional behaviour show that relatively passive methods of disseminating and
implementing guidelines-by publication in professional journals or mailing to
targeted healthcare professionals-rarely lead to changes in professional
behaviour." 203 In this regard Furrow has been critical of institutional infrastructure:
Institutions have been slow to adopt sophisticate information
194 Id.
195 http://www.guideline.gov/index.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
196 MEDSCAPE, Medscape Multispecialty Practice Guidelines, at http://www.medscape.com/
Home/Topics/multispecialty/directories/dir-MULT.PracticeGuide.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
197 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, Clinical Practice Guidelines Online,
at http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/cpgonline.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
198 See, e.g., AM. ASS'N CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGISTS, Clinical Guidelines Online Index, at
http://www.aace.com/clin/guidclines (last visited Nov. 12, 2001); AM. COLL. CARDIOLOGY, Clinical
Statements/Guidelines, at http://www.acc.org/clinical/statements.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
199 See, e.g., MEDEXACT, at http://www.medexact.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2001). MedExact
offers centralized, well-designed treatment information on over 600 conditions and disease states.
MedExact's treatment information is drawn from the publications of leading medical associations and
institutions such as the National Cancer Institute, the National Institutes of Health, and the American
Diabetes Association, and are approved by these organizations before being posted at MedExact.
MedExact also includes direct links to these organizations' own sites. Id.
200 http://www.nlm.nih.gov/nlmhome.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2001).
201 See supra text accompanying note 145.
202 A clinical pathway is a tool that sets locally agreed clinical standards, based on the
best available evidence, for managing specific groups of patients. The pathway forms
part or all of the patient's record and allows the care given by members of ffie
multidisciplinary team, together with the progress and outcome, to be documented.
See Editorial, Peter E. Bundred & Denise J. Kitchiner, Clinical Pathways: A Practical Tool for Specifying,
Evaluating and Improving the Quality of Clinical Practice, 170 MED. J. AUSTL. 54, 54 (1999). See also
ROBERT TROW13RIDGE & SCOTT WEINGARTEN, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, Pub.
No. 01-E057, MAKING HEALTH CARE SAFER: A CIITICAL ANALYSIS OF PATIENT SAFETY PRACTICES, Ch.
52. Critical Pathways (2001), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/ptsafety/chap52.htm.
203 Gene Feder et al., Using Clinical Guidelines, 318 BRIT. MED. J. 728, 728 (1999).
AN eHEALTH DIPTYCH
systems to incorporate patient data and current research. MCOs
have been so preoccupied with maintaining market share in a
competitive health care economy that they have often
deemphasized the goal of quality care. Likewise, many hospitals
scrambling to consolidate in regional and local markets have not
created management information systems that would better help
their medical staffs digest new research information on good
practice. 204
It is just this type of IT infrastructure that institutions will build to interface with
the HIPAA-EDI architecture. As these kinds of proactive risk-avoidance systems are
implemented, the natural correlate is that the normative standard of care expected of
all physicians and institutions will evolve to reflect the new information that becomes
available. Even prior to the development .of expert systems, as doctors increasingly
have access to the Internet, they will be able to access the vast amounts of objective,
evidence-based data that is available online. 205 As Furrow has concluded, "[t]he Web
is a comfortable tool that is likely to become a source of constant pressure on
physicians to improve medical practice." 206 Clearly, medical malpractice opinions
have taken careful note of the way in which the dissemination of medical information
has changed. For example, one of the leading cases advocating a national standard of
care concluded:
Even a cursory analysis of the policy behind the locality doctrine
reveals that whatever relevance it has to the practice of medicine in
remote rural communities, it has no relevance to medical practice in
the District of Columbia. Clearly the nation's capital is not a
community isolated from recent advances in the quality of care and
treatment of patients. Rather, it is one of the leading medical
centers in quality health care. The medical schools in the nation's
capital rate as some of the most outstanding schools in the nation.
The hospitals in the District not only possess some of the most
recent medical technology, but also attract some of the best medical
talent from all over the country. Moreover, medical journals from
all over the country are available to health care professionals in the
District of Columbia, serving to keep practitioners abreast of
developments in other communities. In short, the locality rule was
designed to protect medical practitioners in rural communities, not
practitioners in leading metropolitan centers such as the District of
Columbia.
Moreover, any purported disparity between the skills of
practitioners in various urban centers has for the most part been
eliminated. Unlike the diversified and often limited training that
was available a hundred years ago, medical education has been
standardized throughout the nation through a system of national
accreditation. . . .Moreover, the significant improvements in
204 Barry R. Furrow, Broadcasting Clinical Guidelines on the Internet: Will Physicians Tune
In?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 403, 409 (1999) (footnotes Omitted).
205 See, e.g., Tyler Chin, Gathering Clinical Evidence Online, AMNEWS, Dec. 11, 2000,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/tesa 1211 .htm.
206 Furrow, supra note 204, at 421.
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transportation and communication over the past hundred years cast
further doubt on continued vitality of the doctrine.
In sum, the major underpinnings of the locality doctrine no
longer obtain. 207
The parallel is obvious. Driven by the HIPAA-EDI technology infrastructure,
pervasive high-speed access to evidence-based data, clinical guidelines and
successful practices, emerging knowledge systems will have a far greater impact on
the standard of care than nationally accredited medical education and widely
available journals did a generation ago. While that latter revolution in information
prompted courts to replace the locality rule with a national standard of care, the
technologically-mediated knowledge revolution inevitably will lead to the demotion
of subjective expert testimony and its eventual replacement with far more objective
metrics.
Remarkably, even the admissibility of practice guidelines in malpractice cases
remains unsettled and seldom commented on by the courts. One of the few decided
cases directly on point is Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants, P.C..208 In Frakes, the
defendant's attorney used a table excerpted from a practice guideline while cross-
examining the plaintiff's medical expert and during examination of the defendant and
a defense witness. The court of appeals affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the
defense, placing considerable emphasis on the trial court's discretion. 209 The plaintiff
argued that the table constituted hearsay21o because it was "prepared by an unknown
number of unknown doctors who were not present and were not subject to cross-
examination at trial." 211  Addressing this issue, the court held that the table was
properly admitted to impeach the defense witness under the state evidence code's
learned treatise exception, but that the practice guideline did not fall under the
broader hearsay exception for "Market Reports and Commercial Publications." 21 2
While correct on the latter point, the court's narrow "impeachment approach" to
the admissibility of practice guidelines is consistent only with the old common law
rule, 213 albeit one retained in the Tennessee code. 214 Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence and those of the overwhelming majority of states codes modeled on them, it
seems clear that the modem learned treatise exception would render practice
207 Morrison v. MacNamara, 407 A.2d 555, 562-63 (D.C. 1979) (citations omitted).
208 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 597, *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1997). See also Rodriguez v.
Jackson, 574 P.2d 481 (Ariz. App. 1977); Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177 (D.C.
1990); Campbell v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1,768 So.2d 803 (La. Ct. App. 2000); Comfeldt v. Tongen,
295 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. 1980); Bever v. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts, 2001 WL 68307
(W.D. Mo. Jan. 30, 2001).
209 Frakes, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 597, at*l.
210 Id. at *3 (basing the argument on FED. R. EvID. 801).
211 Id. at *9.
212 Id. at *13-14 (noting that TENN. R. EvID. 803(17) is identical to FED. RULES Ev1D. 803(18)).
213 See, e.g., McCay v. Mitchell, 463 S.W.2d 710, 715 (Tenn Ct. App. 1970).
214 TENN. EVID. RULE 618 provides:
To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-
examination or relied upon by the witness in direct examination, statements
contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history,
medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the
testimony or admission of the witness, by other expert testimony, or by judicial
notice, may be used to impeach the expert witness's credibility but may not be
received as substantive evidence.
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guidelines admissible beyond instances of impeachment, 2 15 albeit as an adjunct to
oral testimony rather than as an exhibit. 216
While Frakes itself is, therefore, of limited applicability, it is easier to approve
of the sentiment underlying Judge Koch's concurrence when he argued that
"[c]linical practice guidelines have emerged within the past few years as one of the
medical profession's responses to the perceived shortcomings in medical practice....
Rather than being a mere sampling of professional opinion, these guidelines provide
consensus standards of conduct that are both clearer and more rational than those
currently used to identify professional negligence." 217 Indeed, in everyday litigation
practice it is likely that clinical guidelines will sidle into medical malpractice trials in
the manner approved by the majority opinion in Frakes, which noted, "this is not a
situation where a jury is improperly exposed to unexamined hearsay . . . the result
was exactly the same as if one of the experts had been asked to go to the board and
list the standards to be applied in interpreting the stress test."218
Assuming admissibility, however, the issue arises as to the legal, normative
effect of such evidence. Several discrete questions arise which reinforce the
importance of the clinical practice issue and its potential for the resolution of legal as
well as medical issues when integrated into expert systems. For example, can
215 FED. R. EvID. 803(18) provides:
Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness
upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as
a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other
expert testimony or by judicial notice....
Cf. TENN. EVID. R. 803 (18) Advisory Commission Comment: "Learned treatises can be used to
impeach an expert but are not themselves admissible to prove the truth of their contents. No good
reason exists to permit hearsay to be taken as true just because it is written in books. Fed. R. Evid.
803(18) is contra." See also Greathouse v. Rhodes, 618 N.W.2d 106, 115-16 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000)
(applying minority impeachment rule).
216 "If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits."
FED. R. EvID. 803(18). See also Tart v. McGann, 697 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1982):
[Rule 803(18)] explicitly permits the admission of medical literature as
substantive evidence "to the extent called to the attention of an expert witness
upon cross-examination or relied upon by him in direct examination" as long as it
is established that such literature is authoritative.
Most commentators found the hearsay objections to learned treatise
evidence unconvincing, and recommended that treatises be admitted as
substantive evidence. Some commentators went so far as to suggest that treatises
be admitted independently of an expert's testimony.... The Advisory Committee
rejected this position, noting that a treatise might be 'misunderstood and
misapplied without expert assistance and supervision.' Accordingly, the Rule
permits the admission of learned treatises as substantive evidence, hut only when
an expert is on the stand and available to explain and assist in the application of
the treatise .... (citations omitted).
217 Frakes, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 597 at, *15-16 (reference omitted).
218 Id. at *11. See also Davenport By and Through Davenport v. Ephraim McDowell Mem'l
Hosp., Inc., 769 S.W.2d 56, 61-62 (Ky. App. 1988):
The next exhibit considered objectionable by the appellants was identified
as "Guidelines for Standards of Care and Management Standards in the Post
Anesthesia Care Unit," published by the American Society of Post Anesthesia
Nurses. Appellants regard this document as a learned treatise, but we do not. It is
more akin to the Public Safety Commission's standards considered by the court in
Vaught's Adm'x v. Kentucky Utilities Co. The court found them to be helpful as a
guide for measuring care. We'regard the nurses'.publication in a similar fashion,
and see no error in its being admitted as an exhibit (citations omitted).
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compliance or noncompliance with practice guidelines, standing alone, sustain a
verdict rendered in the absence of any countervailing evidence of customary
standards? 219 Could such evidence sustain a verdict in the face of countervailing
expert testimony as to customary standards? 220 Would a practice guideline, or the
traditional evidence of customary practices with which it was competing, be given the
status of "exercise ofjudgment" 221 or that of a "school of thought" 222 or "respectable
minority"?223 Should courts use practice guidelines symmetrically or asymmetrically
(i.e., for inculpatory as well as exculpatory purposes)? 224
Kacmar has argued, primarily in the context of journal data, that "[c]omputer
information technology is progressing at an unprecedented rate, as is the volume of
innovative medical literature. Nevertheless, it seems that mandating the use of, or
even admitting evidence gleaned from, a computerized MEDLINE search is, as yet,
unworkable, particularly in light of the database's inherent limitations."2 25 Kacmar
has noted reasons given for this negative conclusion, including the fact that the
medical databases are incomplete, the metadata is unreliable, the data-mining tools
are imperfect and high service and sorting costs are imposed. 226
These arguments will be considerably weaker in the face of the knowledge bases
that will be built on top of the HIPAA-EDI inspired architecture. The costs of these
systems will be borne by institutions and will reflect a far more robust data set; not
only MEDLINE, but practice guidelines and best practices. Data-mining will be
improved by using fuzzy logic 227 systems. The most important refinement that the
next generation of systems will bring is the development of systems that are
automated and personalized.2 28 These will not be passive systems that require
physicians to access them and compose searches (although that will and must remain
219 See, e.g., Frakes, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 597, at *15-16. ("[T]hey should not necessarily
be viewed as conclusive evidence of the standard of care. Proof of compliance with practice guidelines
should not necessarily establish due care; just as proof of noncompliance should not establish
negligence per se." (reference omitted)).
220 See, e.g., United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 519 (Colo. 1992) (holding that
blood bank from which woman received AIDS-contaminated blood should be judged using ordinary
principles of negligence, and that the defendant's conduct should be measured against what a
reasonable and prudent blood bank would or should have done under the same or similar
circumstances); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 984 (Wash. 1974) (finding that ophthalmologist
breached reasonable standard of care by failing to administer a glaucoma test to woman with
substantial vision loss).
221 See, e.g., Velazquez v. Portadin, 751 A.2d 102, 107-11 (N.J. 2000) (finding that a
physician's professional conduct implicates only the exercise of reasonable care in the performance of a
medical procedure, and not the exercise of medical judgment in selecting among acceptable and
medically reasonable courses of treatment).
222 See, e.g., Clark v. Doe, 695 N.E.2d 276, 302-03 (Ohio 1997) (finding a two schools of
thought jury instruction misleading in case involving poorly treated broken leg); Levine v. Rosen, 616
A.2d 623, 626-27 (Pa. 1992) (finding no evidence of divergent opinions, the court rejected the two
schools of thought defense in malpractice case involving negligent diagnosis of breast cancer).
223 See, e.g., State Bd. of Med. Examiners v. McCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188, 1194-95 (Colo. 1994)
(rejecting the respected minority rule, noting that the accepted standard of medical practice can not be
ascertained by "counting how many physicians follow a particular practice").
224 See Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 666 (2001).
225 Donald E. Kacmar, The Impact of Computerized Medical Literature Databases on Medical
Malpractice Litigation: Time for Another Helling v. Carey Wake-Up Call?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 617, 654 (1997).
226 Id. at 639-53.
227 For a definition, see whatis?com, at http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,289893,
sid9_gci212172,00.html (last visited Nov. 11,2001).
228 See, e.g., PERSONALIZATION CONSORTIUM, at http://www.personalization.org/ (last visited
Nov. 17, 2001).
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an option), but will be triggered by the CPR and specific medical interventions.
Sorting costs will be dramatically reduced because the systems will seek data
that is specific or personalized to the individual patient's CPR in question.
Notwithstanding, and as Rosoff has persuasively argued, "[d]irect application of
CPGs [Clinical Practice Guidelines] as setting the legal standard for medical care is
an extreme recognition that seems inappropriate and unlikely at this relatively early
stage of development of CPGs."229. Mello has gone further, arguing that:
[I]ncreased reliance on clinical practice guidelines to establish the
standard of care in medical malpractice cases would be undesirable
whether the guidelines are used in an inculpatory or an exculpatory
fashion. Among the reasons for disallowing the inculpatory use of
CPGs is that CPGs do not appear to represent custom in most
instances. Compliance with most guidelines is presently quite low,
so that the guidelines cannot be said to embody prevailing medical
practice. Departing from custom as the anchor of the standard of
care, and relying on the prescriptions of CPGs instead, could
undermine the deterrent function of tort law by increasing the
amount of uncertainty physicians face in determining what the law
requires of them.230
The doubts that so many have expressed about using practice guidelines as the
standard of care in malpractice cases has led Rosoff to call for a federal certification
program for practice guidelines to be operated by AHRQ.231 Absent such a system,
and while justice, efficiency and other public policy concerns may militate against the
broader legal utilization of practice guidelines, operationally, the battle against
practice guidelines is almost over. Institutional informational systems will be fuelled
by this type of "objective" data. Computer surveillance systems will operate on the
basis that practice guidelines and their fellow travelers represent the correct
methodology and the conclusive metric. Adverse result reporting will reflect that
objectivity.
B. RESPONDING TO NEW BUSINESS MODELS
If bricks-and-mortar healthcare businesses are only now, with nudging from
HIPAA-EDI, realizing the potential of their information architecture, they are
somewhat more advanced in their technologically-mediated B2C ventures.
Marketing is the lifeblood of credence-good businesses, such as hospitals and
pharmaceutical companies who have been cut off from patients by MCOs. Here,
institutional progress is driven less directly by HIPAA-EDI related infrastructure and
more by the related general acceptance of technology within institutions. It should be
noted, however, that one of the strongest battles during the HIPAA privacy
regulations comment period implicated the continued ability of healthcare entities to
229 Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Health Care Reform, 5
HEALTH MATRIX 369, 383-84 (1995).
230 Mello, supra note 224, at 708-09. Cf. Richard E. Leahy, Comment, Rational Health Policy
and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for Judicial Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77
CALIF. L. REV. 1483, 1506 (1989) (arguing that courts should take judicial notice of practice guidelines
promulgated by legitimate medical authorities as the legal standard of care).
231 Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront Clinical
Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 327, 356 (2001).
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use PH1232 for their own marketing purposes. The final regulation permits providers
to use PHI without prior authorization for marketing their own products and services
and those of third parties. 233 The regulation is subject only to an opt-out provision
for the patient after the initial marketing contact.234 This provision has been the
subject of considerable criticism by privacy advocates. 235 Similarly, the regulation
allows for providers to use a limited subset of PHI for fundraising purposes. 236
As provider databases swell with information about their patients, and
providers become more adept at exploiting new technologically-mediated marketing
channels-including one-to-one marketing via the Internet-their marketing practices
will evolve and themselves implicate liability laws. This is already the case with
television, print and Internet advertising of prescription pharmaceuticals. The "old"
learned intermediary rule, which set up the prescribing physician as the primary
defendant in a failure to warn case, 2 37 is being vaporized by the growth of direct-to-
consumer (DTC) pharmaceutical advertising,238 which will necessitate a reassessment
of manufacturers' liability. 239
Similarly, as healthcare institutions increase their marketing presence on the
Web and elsewhere, they are likely to stress their own brand and reputation more than
that of the individual physicians they credential. Courts already are noticing this
marketing trend. They seem prepared to adapt malpractice liability rules, which
historically have looked at individual physicians as the default defendants in
malpractice cases, and accelerate the movement toward institutional liability. 240
232 Individually identifiable health information is information that is a subset of
health information, including demographic information collected from an
individual, and:
(I) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or
health care clearinghouse; and
(2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of
an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or
future payment for the provision of health care to an individual; and
(i) That identifies the individual; or
(ii) With respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe the information
can be used to identify the individual.
Protected health information means individually identifiable health information:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this definition, that is:
(i) Transmitted by electronic media;
(ii) Maintained in any medium described in the definition of electronic media at
§162.103 of this subchapter; or
(iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium.
45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001):
233 Id.
234 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2001).
235 See Robert O'Harrow, Patient Files Opened to Marketers, Fundraisers, WASH. POST, Jan.
16, 2001, at E01.
236 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(0 (2001).
237 See Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 880 (Ohio 1991) (holding that
physician established necessary relationship with plaintiff to be considered a learned intermediary and
had duty to warn patient of risks of investigational drug).
238 See generally Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,314 (May 14, 1996); Draft
Guidance for Industry; Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements; Availability, 62 Fed. Reg.
43,171 (Aug. 12, 1997); Guidance for Industry on Consumer-Directed Advertisements; Availability, 64
Fed. Reg. 43,197 (Aug. 9, 1999).
239 See, e.g., Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1263 (N.J. 1999). See also Vitanza v.
Upjohn Co., 214 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2000).
240 See, e.g., Kashishian v. Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 278 (Wis. 1992). See also Jones v. Chicago
HMO Ltd. 730 N.E.2d 1119 (Ill. 2000); Petrovich v. Share Health Plan 719 N.E.2d 756 (II1. 1999);
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Bricks-and-mortar healthcare businesses with innovative business models share
healthcare marketing space with entirely new entities that will operate as information
brokers or infomediaries between providers and patients. 241 Bates and Gawande have
observed that, "The Internet changes the exercise of quality measurement in several
ways. First, quality information-including reputation-will be more readily
available. Second, consumers will increasingly use it. Third, the Internet provides a
low-cost, standard platform that will make it vastly easier for providers to collect
quality information and pass it on to others." 242  The liability correlate to this
phenomenon is that the ehealth defendant pool will be swelled by an increasing
number of intermediaries and infomediaries. As more data becomes available
through modem IT systems, data-mining will become more sophisticated and outputs
more personalized, so the factual realm of "foreseeable" risk will expand, as will the
number of parties who have actual or constructive foresight of such risks.243
Even infomediaries with recognized error-reducing credentials will be swept
into the expanding defendant base. For example, Rosoff has raised the issue of the
potential liability of those who promulgate practice guidelines. 244 In the purely
online world of Web sites that provide medical information and advice, a similar
question must be asked as to the liability of trustmarking and kitemarking
organizations. Several highly respected organizations have put forward self-
regulatory codes of conduct with accompanying trustmarks, seals or kitemarks for
those who comply.245 Such systems are not without their difficulties246 and critics. 247
Trustmarking organizations that provide inaccurate "false positive" endorsements of
online medical advice may well fall foul of Section 324A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts,24s which has been successfully utilized in the offline world against
certifiers or endorsers of defective products. 249 Despite this, with regulatory agencies
Gilbert v. Sycamore Mun. Hosp., 622 N.E.2d 788 (Il1. 1993); Sword v. NKC Hosps., Inc., 714 N.E.2d
142 (Ind. 1999). See discussion infra of institutional liability for failure to provide informed consent
accompanying text at note 338.
241 See supra text accompanying notes 177.
242 David W. Bates & Atul A. Gawande, The Impact of The Internet: on Quality Measurement,
HEALTH AFF., Nov./DEC., at 104, 104 (2000).
243 See generally Terry, supra note 188, at 773-74.
244 Rosoff, supra note 229, at 238.
245 INTER.NET HEALTHCARE COALITION, eHealth Code of Ethics, at http://www.ihealthcoalition.org/
ethics/ehcode.html (2000); HEALTH ON THE NET FOUNDATION, HonCode, at http://www.hon.ch/HONcode/
Conduct.html (1997); HI-ETHICS, INC., Health Internet Ethics: Ethical Principles For Offering Internet
Health Services to Consumers, at http://www.hiethics.org/Principles/index.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
246 See Alejandro R. Jadad & Anna Gagliardi, Rating Health Information on the Internet:
Navigating to Knowledge or to Babel?, 279 JAMA 611,611 (1998).
247 Tony Delamothe, Editorial, Quality oftWebsites: kitemarking the west wind, 321 BRIT. MED.
J. 843, 843 (2000).
248 One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third
person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon
the undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1997).
249 For example, in Hempstead v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F. Supp. 109, 118 (D. Del.
1967), Underwriter's Laboratories, a well-known non-profit testing laboratory, was held potentially
liable after a whitelisted fire extinguisher exploded, The court noted: "The alleged failure of
Underwriters to exercise reasonable care in approving the design of the extinguisher has obviously
increased the risk of harm to plaintiff over that which would have existed if reasonable care had been
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practically unable to extend their immediate work beyond the most obvious types of
fraudulent marketing, 25 0 such infomediaries are likely to proliferate and even receive
governmental encouragement.
C. ONLINE HEALTH INFORMATION
As online healthcare expands its reach, volume and sophistication, the courts
may well turn their attention to the liability of online advice sites. As I have argued
elsewhere, malpractice-like actions against medical advice Web sites that primarily
supply information are fraught with technical legal difficulties, including freedom of
speech arguments, 251 potential statutory immunities 25 2 and a sparse history of
publishers being held responsible for "advice" or "how-to" books.253 Even where the
perpetrators are traditional healthcare entities such as doctors, and thus apparently
amenable to less revolutionary liability theories, consumers injured by their acts or
omissions may find their traditional theories of liability practically stymied by a
discovery that the defendant's malpractice insurance does not cover such online
activities. 254
Taken as whole, therefore, the HIPAA-EDI architecture will compel or
stimulate infrastructure upon which providers will build sophisticated information
systems or, less directly, furnish both patients and providers with incentives to enter
the online medical space. The legal standard of care inevitably will react, adopting
increasingly objective standards that reflect the quality-driven data that will flow
through our healthcare delivery system and the expert systems which will fine tune
that data to solve individual patients' health needs. Furthermore, as the data
proliferates, it seems unavoidable that courts will extend the reach of malpractice-like
doctrine to new activities and new actors. Just as technology has the potential to
rehabilitate our delivery system by reducing error, our courts will not likely ignore
the reach or the normative effects of its implementation.
V. CONSENT TO DISCLOSURE IN PRIVACY REGIMES AND INFORMED
CONSENT
While privacy will have medium and long-term effects on the quality of care, its
most immediate effects may well be on a subset of malpractice law: informed
exercised." Id. This proposition was later approved by the court in Arnstein v. Mfg. Chemists Ass, 414
F. Supp. 12, 14-15 (E.D. Pa. 1976), which also posited potential liability based on the closely related
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 323. See also Nicolas P. Terry, Rating the "Raters": Legal
Exposure of Trustmark Authorities in the Context of Cbnsumer Health Informatics, 2 J. MED.
INTERNET RESEARCH c 18 (2000), available at http://www.jmir.org/2000/3/e18.
250 See, e.g., Press Release, FED. TRADE COMM'N, "Operation Cure.All" Wages New Battle in
Ongoing War Against Internet Health Fraud June 14, 2001, (describing the joint FTC and FDA initiative
targeting the fraudulent marketing and sale of dietary supplements and other products on the Internet),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/06/cureall.htm. See also Greg Winter, U.S. Vows More Scrutiny of
Health Ads on Net, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2001, at C4; David McGuire, Govt. Agencies Crack Down On
Online Comfrey Sales, NEWSBYTES, (July 9, 2001), at http://www.ncwsbytes.com/news/01l/167742.html..
251 Nicolas P. Terry, Cyber-Malpractice: Legal Exposure for Cybermedicine, 25 AM. J.L. & MED.
349, 352 (1999).
252 E.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1994) (providing arguable ISP/Web publisher immunity). See Jane Doe
One v. Oliver, 755 A.2d 1000, 1002 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2000).
253 Terry, supra note 251, at 354-55.
254 Linda 0. Prager, Doctors May Face Liability Risks in Bidding for Patients on Web Auction
Sites, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 4, 2000, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/
prsa09O4.htm
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consent. This section examines the PIHI disclosure rules and how they intersect with
the substance of modern consent law and the operational aspects of consent.
Specifically, the very strongly delineated consent-to-disclosure provisions in the PIHI
regulations are likely to influence the way institutions deal with informed consent-
related disclosure, resulting in an operational co-joining of their processes. This
section also examines whether the PIHI regulations and the increased scrutiny they
should bring to patient consent-to-disclose will increase the prevalence and
robustness of informed consent. Conversely, it must be asked whether informed
consent will suffer at the hands of an increasingly mechanistic approach to such
events. This section concludes with a discussion of how the HIPAA-EDI inspired
architecture will facilitate new technologically-mediated healthcare products and
services and will require an expansion of informed consent to cover such physician-
patient interactions.
A. THE PIHI SYSTEM OF CONSENT AND AUTHORIZATION
As noted above, HIPAA-mandated privacy creates no serious disincentives to
the collection of health information. Rather, the regulatory model is one of
controlled and gradated disclosure. PIHI regulates disclosure and use in two ways.
First, it applies a global "minimum necessary" rule to disclosures and uses;2 "5
although it derogates from that rule in cases of treatment or when the disclosure is
required-by law.256 Second, PIHI invokes gradated levels of permissions dependent
on the type of information utilization contemplated. These levels are: (1) required
disclosure to the patient or to the DHHS Office for Civil Rights 25 7 (OCR); 25 8 (2)
permitted disclosure to a broad range of public health, law enforcement and judicial
authorities, as required by law and subject to various conditions; 25 9 (3) consented-to
disclosure for treatment, payment or healthcare operations (TPO) purposes; 260 and (4)
authorized disclosures for other purposes. 26 1 Types (3) and (4) are most likely to
share conceptual and operational space with treatment-related informed consent.
PIHI primarily distinguishes between consent and authorization to give effect to
the distinction made in the rules between treatment-related and other disclosures or
uses. Consent to disclosure of PHI is required "prior to using or disclosing protected
health information to carry out treatment, payment, or health care operations." 262 In
other situations, authorization is required. 263 These two types of acquiescence to
disclosure differ primarily in their detailed operational aspects. Consent is
considerably more pro forma; it may be general,264 brief,265 given one time266 and a
255 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1) (2001) ("When using or disclosing protected health information
or when requesting protected health information from another covered entity, a covered entity must
make reasonable efforts to limit protected health information to the minimum necessary to accomplish
the intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.").
256 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(2) (2001).
257 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(2) (2001).
258 OCR has been given enforcement jurisdiction. See Statement of Delegation of Authority to
the Office for Civil Rights, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,831 (Dec. 28, 2000).
259 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2001).
260 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2001).
261 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2001).
262 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a) (2001).
263 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2001).
264 "The consent document may be brief and, may be written in general terms."
GUIDANCE/Q&As, supra note 37.
265 A consent document is brief (may be less than one page). It must refer to the
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provider may refuse to treat a patient who refuses consent. 267 An individual may
request restrictions on uses or disclosures of health information for TPO, but the
provider need not agree to the restriction requested. 268 Treatment generally cannot be
conditioned on authorization (for example, to the hospital selling PHI to a
pharmaceutical company) 269 and in most cases cannot be general or compound, but
rather, must be specific to the disclosure permission requested. 270 Both consents and
authorizations may be revoked. 271
The consent-to-disclosure instrument must be in plain language and explain or
refer to other PIHI rights that the patient has. 272 It may be combined with and sought
at the same time (e.g., upon admission) as other permissions such as informed
consent.273  An authorization instrument also must be in plain language 274 but
generally may not be part of a compound document. 275 It is required to be more
detailed than a consent instrument with considerably more specificity as to the PHI to
be disclosed, the purposes of the disclosure and the patient's legal rights. 276 In a
narrow range of situations, authorization can be achieved through a patient opt-out
provision, such as in the marketing rules discussed above, 277 or through facility
directories 278
B. POST-MODERN INFORMED CONSENT
Similar to the PIHI rules' distinction between consent and authorization, post-
modern informed consent279 law is not a singular concept.280  The original, pre-
notice and must inform the individual that he has the opportunity to review the
notice prior to signing the consent. The Privacy Rule does not require that the
individual read the notice or that the covered entity explain each item in the
notice before the individual provides consent. We expect that some patients will
simply sign the consent while others will read the notice carefully and discuss
some of the practices with the covered entity.
Id.
266 A patient's written consent need only be obtained by a provider one time .... A
health care provider needs to obtain consent from a patient for use or disclosure
of PHI only one time. This is true regardless of whether there is a connected
course of treatment or treatment for unrelated conditions. A provider will need to
obtain a new consent from a patient only if the patient has revoked the consent
between treatments.
Id.
267 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b) (2001).
268 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(4) (2001).
269 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(4) (2001).
270 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3) (2001).
271 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.506(b)(5), 164.508(b)(5) (2001).
272 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c) (2001).
273 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(b)(4) (2001).
274 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(2) (2001).
275 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(3) (2001).
276 45 C.F.R. §164.508(c)(d)(e)(f) (2001).
277 See supra text accompanying note 234.
278 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (2001).
279 See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Apologetic Tort Think: Autonomy and Information Torts, 38
ST. LOUIS L.J. 189, 189-90 (1993) (contending that that the doctrine of informed consent does not, as
commonly assumed, have a fully developed ethical structure).
280 See generally Frances H. Miller, Health Care Information Technology and Informed
Consent: Computers and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 31 IND. L. REV. 1019, 1032 (1998)
(discussing how "the theoretical basis fora physician's negligent failure to secure an informed patient
consent to therapy has come a very long way from the original battery rationale for requiring patient
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patient autonomy notion of medical consent functioned as a defense to the tort of
battery, where the touching was done by a healthcare professional. 281 Informed
consent had its genesis in cases that were tried under a battery theory, in which there
had been actual consent, but the plaintiff argued that the consent had been vitiated by
nonexistent or inaccurate information. 28 2 The modem approach was initiated when
the courts decided that vitiation cases, which featured intentional contact but
unintended harm, did not belong in the intentional torts category because of either
doctrinal or allocational rationales. 283  Thereafter, the courts have distinguished
between cases involving an absence of consent, which are properly brought in
battery, 284 and those that involved consent actually given but allegedly given without
adequate disclosure of risk, which are properly brought in malpractice.285
consent to medical touching").
281 Terry, supra note 279, at 192.
282 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B (1997). See, e.g., Micari v. Mann, 481
N.Y.S.2d 967 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). Although no physical force was employed, the court found a
teacher's requirement of sexual acts during class a form of sexual abuse which warranted punitive
damages. Id. at 970.
283 See, e.g., Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 31 1-13 (Wis. 1973):
First, the act complained of in these cases simply does not fit comfortably within
the traditional concepts of battery-the intent to unlawfully touch the person of
another. In cases such as the instant one, physicians are invariably acting in good faith
and for the benefit of the patient. While the result may not be that desired, the act
complained of is surely not of an antisocial nature usually associated with the tort of
assault and battery or battery .... Second, and related to the first, the failure to inform
a patient is probably not, in the usual case, an intentional act and hence not within the
traditional concept of intentional torts. Third, the act complained of in informed
consent cases is not within the traditional idea of "contact" or "touching." In the
typical situation, as here, the physician impeccably performs the surgery or other
treatment. Complained of are the personal reactions to such treatment which are
unanticipated by the patient .... Fourth, a valid question exists with respect to whether
a physician's malpractice insurance covers liability for an arguably "criminal" act-
battery.... Fifth, these essentially negligence cases do not fit the traditional mold of
situations wherein punitive damages can be awarded. For these reasons, we conclude it
is preferable to affirmatively recognize a legal duty, bottomed upon a negligence
theory of liability, in cases wherein it is alleged the patient-plaintiff was not informed
adequately of the ramifications of a course of treatment.
See also Matthies v, Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 461 (N.J. 1999) ("The rationale for basing an informed
consent action on negligence rather than battery principles is that the physician's failure is better viewed as a
breach of a professional responsibility than as a nonconsensual touching").
284 See, e.g., McNeil v. Brewer, 710 N.E.2d 1285, 1288-89 (111. App. Ct.1999):
To state a claim for battery based upon a lack of informed consent to
medical procedures, a plaintiff must allege a total lack of consent to a medical
procedure involving an intentional unauthorized touching of the plaintiffs person
by another. The elements of such a claim consist of (1) an intentional act on the
part of the defendant; (2) a resulting offensive contact with the plaintiffs person;
and (3) a lack of consent to the defendant's conduct. An "offensive contact" may
be established by proof that the defendant intended to cause the plaintiff, directly
or indirectly, to come into contact with a foreign substance in a manner which the
plaintiff would reasonably regard as offensive (references omitted).
See also Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1363-64 (Del. 1995) (holding that "the incidental touching
of a patient by an HIV-infected dentist while performing ordinary, consented-to dental procedures is
insufficient to sustain a battery claim in the absence of a channel for HIV infection."); Gaskin v.
Goldwasser, 520 N.E.2d 1085, 1095 (111. App. Ct. 1988) (finding that removal of patient's lower teeth
was without consent and thus sufficient to support a battery theory of recovery).
285 See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal.,1972). See also Lugenbuhl v. Dowling, 701 So. 2d
447, 456 (La. 1997) (holding that doctor failed to obtain adequate informed consent when he failed to discuss
with a patient the risks of mesh use in hernia repair); Pema v.. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 440-41 (N.J. 1983)
(holding that a patient who consents to surgery by one surgebn, but is actually operated on by another, has an
action for malpractice against the former and for battery against the latter).
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Originally, "failure to disclose" cases were governed by traditional malpractice
principles, particularly the use of a customary practice standard derived from expert
testimony.2 86 As this negligence-based line of cases came under the influence of
patient rights and personal autonomy arguments, 287 however, some jurisdictions
began to assess the appropriate level of disclosure against a patient standard; based on
expectations or a need to know that, arguably, better reflects the physician-patient
informational asymmetry. 2 8 8
Similar to the question of the standard of disclosure, courts have struggled to
define the reach of the duty. For example, many courts limit the duty to disclose to
surgical risks.289 Some courts still view informed consent cases as legally-deficient,
"bad results" cases in which the plaintiff is seeking to promote a theory of liability
other than conventional malpractice (e.g., negligent diagnosis or treatment) in a
situation that has overall merit yet is flawed (i.e., on evidentiary grounds). 290 For a
majority of courts, therefore, the informed consent doctrine supports a relatively
unsophisticated, even literal consent model derived from basic autonomy principles.
In contrast, the fundamental informational asymmetry between patient and
physician, and the goal of having the patient more involved in the decision making
process, have had a relatively minor effect on doctrinal development. 29t As a result,
informed consent law is still primarily about consent, not the information that is
286 See, e.g., Campbell v. Palmer, 568 A,2d 1064, 1067 (Conn. App. 1990)
287 See generally JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) (discussing
the obstacles between meaningful physician patient interaction); see also Jay Katz, Informed Consent-
A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137 (1977).
288 The classic case remains that of Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C.Cir.1972). See
also Pluger v. Physicians Ins. Co., 549 N.W.2d 286 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996); Largey v. Rothman, 540
A.2d 504 (N.J. 1988). See generally the appendix in Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371 (Ga. Ct. App.
2000), providing a summary of the law on the issue of informed consent. Some legislatures have also
entered the fray:
"Informed consent" means the consent of a patient to the performance of health
care services by a health care provider given after the health care provider has
informed the patient, to an extent reasonably comprehensible to general lay
understanding, of the nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and of the
risks and alternatives to treatment or diagnosis which a reasonable patient would
consider material to the decision whether or not to undergo the treatment or
diagnosis.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6801(6) (2000). Cf TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118 (2000):
In a malpractice action, the plaintiff shall prove by evidence . . . that the
defendant did not supply appropriate information to the patient in obtaining
informed consent (to the procedure out of which plaintiffs claim allegedly arose)
in accordance with the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in
the profession and in the specialty, if any, that the defendant practices in the
community in which the defendant practices and in similar communities.
289 Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 618 (Pa. 1997) (holding that informed consent was not
required in cases involving non-surgical procedures).
290 The relationship is not accidental. Plaintiffs are less likely to complain about deficient
informed consent procedures if the treatment is completed satisfactorily. Equally, plaintiff's attorneys
are unlikely to finance informed consent cases on a contingency fee basis in the absence of severe
damage.
291 Cf. Carson v. Fine, 867 P.2d 610, 617 (Wash. 1994):
Mutual trust and confidence are essential to the physician-patient relationship,
and from these elements flow the physician's obligations to fully inform the
patient of his or her condition, to continue to provide medical care once the
patient-physician relationship has been established, to refer the patient to a
specialist if necessary, and to obtain the patient's informed consent to the medical
treatment proposed.
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required to increase patient choice and participation.292 It is a doctrine that has not
progressed beyond what Veatch describes as a transition status. 293
Notwithstanding, a few courts have examined a broader approach to informed
consent; such as expanding the doctrine's reach to include all treatment risks 294 and
other information such as non-medical risks,295 risks of non-treatment, 296 hard data
such as mortality statistics, 297 and specific physician impairments 298 or financial
interests. 299 The "choice" model is illustrated by the Wisconsin statute that requires:
"Any physician who treats a patient shall inform the patient about the availability of
all alternate, viable medical modes of treatment and about the benefits and risks of
these treatments." 300 As Miller has persuasively argued:
Doctors who ignore their patients' increasingly sophisticated
knowledge base will probably find themselves in a shrinking
minority, more vulnerable to informed consent litigation based on a
failure to discuss therapy at more advanced levels of materiality.
Even in those jurisdictions with physician-centered rather than
patient-oriented standards of disclosure, patients will be likely to
possess or know how to secure far greater medical knowledge than
has been customary in the past and standards of disclosure will
have to rise to accommodate that fact. A little knowledge can
sometimes be a dangerous thing, but ignorance about the meaning
292 The classic exposition of this issue in the legal literature is Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From
Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985).
293 "Consent may be what can be called a transition concept, one that appears on the scene as an
apparently progressive innovation, but after a period of experience turns out to be only useful as a
tranbition to a more thoroughly revisionary conceptual framework." Robert M. Veatch, Abandoning
Informed Consent, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar./Apr. 1995, at 5. Veatch's work is further discussed infra
text at note 305.
294 See, e.g., Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 464 (1999):
It is not dispositive that the alternative that the physician recommends is more or
less invasive than other alternatives. . . .The critical consideration is not the
invasiveness of the procedure, but the patient's need for information to make a
reasonable decision about the appropriate course of medical treatment, whether
invasive or noninvasive.
295 See, e.g., Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 599-600 (Cal. 1993) (declining to require
mandatory disclosure of life expectancy in case where doctor allegedly failed to discuss the low life
expectancy of a patient suffering from pancreatic cancer).
296 See, e.g., Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 907 (Cal. 1980) (holding that doctor had a duty
to provide the decedent with all information material to her decision whether or not to undergo pap
smear diagnostic test). Cf. Vandi v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463, 467 (Cal. 1992)
(holding that the duty of disclosure is predicated upon a recommended treatment or diagnostic
procedure and the failure to recommend a procedure must be addressed under ordinary medical
negligence standards).
297 See, e.g., Johnson v. Kokemoor 545 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Wis. 1996). Cf. Arato v. Avedon, 858
P.2d 598, 599-600 (Cal. 1993).
298 See, e.g., Johnson v. Kokemoor 545 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Wis. 1996). Cf. Duttry v. Patterson,
771 A.2d 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001):
[I]nformation personal to the physician, whether solicited by the patient or not, is
irrelevant to the doctrine of informed consent. Our holding should not, however,
be read to stand for the proposition that a physician who misleads a patient is
immune from suit. Rather, we are merely stating that the doctrine of informed
consent is not the legal panacea for all damages arising out of any type of
malfeasance by a physician.
299 See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 482 (Cal. 1990) (holding that
physician must disclose his proprietary and financial interests in stem cells extracted from a patient).
300 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 448.30 (West 2001).
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of knowledge can be worse. Both doctors and patients will be best
served by working in tandem to harness the profusion of medical
information unleashed by modem technology, in the interest of
patient autonomy. The law of informed consent will require no
less.301
If courts have had much to say about the substantive standards and reach of
informed consent, they have had remarkably little input into the mechanics of
consent. Here, legislatures have been more active. For example, an Ohio statute
states:
Written consent to a surgical or medical procedure or course of
procedures shall, to the extent that it fulfills all the requirements in
divisions (A), (B), and (C) of this section, be presumed to be valid
and effective....
(A) The consent sets forth in general terms the nature and purpose
of the procedure or procedures, and what the procedures are
expected to accomplish, together with the reasonably known risks,
and, except in emergency situations, sets forth the names of the
physicians who shall perform the intended surgical procedures.
(B) The person making the consent acknowledges that such
disclosure of information has been made and that all questions
asked about the procedure or procedures have been answered in a
satisfactory manner.
(C) The consent is signed by the patient .... 302
Such provisions are essentially limited to the mechanics of consent, seeking to
shore up the legal effect of a written consent form. Notwithstanding, a signed
consent form has more to do with "consent" type cases than failure to disclose
allegations. Provisions such as the Ohio legislation are more likely to have an impact
on "general" consents (e.g., to transfusions) acquired at the time of patient admission,
rather than the specific issues and physician duties that call for disclosure prior to a
specific course of treatment or surgery.
C. ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVACY AND CONSENT
If the legal system's version of "consent" remains grounded in a somewhat
literal, even mechanical, model, medical practitioners and ethicists are making more
challenging suggestions. 303 Indeed, one telling observation is that the current legal
model has counter-productive tendencies:
Fully involving patients in clinical decisions is a challenging task for
clinicians, and little training exists on the practice of effective
informed decision making. What guidance exists is often based on
legalistic notions of consent. For instance, the well-known mnemonic
301 Miller, supra note 280, at 1042.
302 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.54 (West 2001). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103(4)(a)
(West 2001) ("A consent which is evidenced in writing ... if validly signed by the patient or another
authorized person, raise a rebuttable presumption of a valid consent").
303 For a summary of consent within different physician-patient models, see Marwan A. Habiba,
Examining Consent within the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 183 (2000).
AN eHEALTH DIPTYCH
PAR reminds the clinician to disclose the nature of the procedure,
alternatives, and risks in any informed consent discussion. The
rationale of this approach either satisfies an administrative
requirement or protects oneself from liability, rather than viewing the
decision making process as a meaningful path toward fostering
patient involvement. 304
For Veatch, the retooling of informed consent is linked to the deconstruction of
individual professional autonomy. 305 This latter concept is clearly no stranger to a
health law system that has embraced industrialized medicine. 306 If Veatch views
choice as the eventual replacement for consent, 307 he identifies the primary obstacle
as asymmetrical value systems of the clinician and her patient.308 The deep value
pairing309 that he envisions, yet somewhat despairs of because of practical
considerations, could well be promoted by the sophisticated health information
systems that we are building. Modem ecommerce's one-to-one marketing thrives on
the ability to personalize information using data explicitly provided for that purpose
by the consumer. For example, a consumer may fill out a "mywebsite" questionnaire
to personalize her Web experience 310 and, more stealthily, the marketers may factor
in a consumer profile harvested from the consumer's online behavior. In a related
context I have argued that:
The ability to heavily personalize computer-mediated relationships
may rehabilitate patient-physician relationships eroded by years of
managed care, while the Web's ability to deliver rich information
directly to consumers could reverse centuries of damaging
informational asymmetry between patient and physician. 311
304 Clarence H. Braddock et a]., Informed Decision Making in Outpatient Practice: Time to Get
Back to Basics, 282 JAMA 2313, 2313-14 (1999).
305 It is increasingly clear if one studies the theory of clinical decision making that
there is no longer any basis for presuming that the clinician can even guess at
what is in the overall best interest of the patient. If that is true, then a model in
which the clinician guesses at what he or she believes is best for the patient,
pausing only to elicit the patient's concurrence will no longer be sufficient.
Increasingly we will have to go beyond patient consent to a model in which
plausible options are presented (perhaps with the professional's recommendation
regarding a personal preference among them, based on the professional's
personally held beliefs and values), but with no rational or "professional" basis
for even guessing at which one might truly be in the patient's best interest.
Veatch, supra note 293, at 5.
306 See. e.g., discussion accompanying supra note 240.
307 Veatch, supra note 293, at 10.
308 Id.
309 As Veatch notes:
If, however, there were alignments, "value pairings," based on the most
fundamental worldviews of the lay person and professional, then there would be
some hope. This probably would mean picking providers on the basis of their
religious and political affiliations, philosophical and social inclinations, and other
deeply penetrating worldviews. To the extent that the provider and patient were
of the same mind set, then there is some reason that the technically competent
clinician could guess fairly well what would serve the patient's interest.
Id. at 11.
310 For background, see Ted Kemp, Personalization Isn't a Product, at http://www.
internetweek.com/newslead0I/leadO6O101 .htm (May 31, 2001).
311 Nicolas Terry, Access vs. Quality Assurance: The e-Health Conundrum, 285 JAMA 807
(2001).
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Facilitating such value symmetry through technology could move us closer to
Veatch's concept of meaningful choice. It could also facilitate increased trust,
particularly merit trust rather than status trust,312 and compassion. As Howe has
observed, "[B]y attending more to their own and to patients' feelings, careproviders
can greatly assist patients who are emotionally vulnerable, and, by doing this,
careproviders may also benefit all patients, by exploring with them the most private
areas of their lives." 313
While the legal and ethical views of informed consent are not always in
harmony, they are at least robust. In contrast, ethical constructs for medical privacy
are still quite rudimentary. While the legal system routinely applies its breach of
confidence rules to both physicians and institutional providers, 314 it is still something
of an individual ethic,3 15 although it is slowly migrating to managed care entities. 316
In an increasingly technology-mediated healthcare environment, privacy and
confidentiality are viewed as "good things" and the occasions of lapses in patient
protection are castigated when reported. 317  Notwithstanding, there have been
cautious attempts to capture some core values with respect to privacy and
confidentiality. 3 18 For example, in dealing with online care, the eHealth Code of
Ethics states:
People who use the Internet for health-related reasons have the right
to expect that personal data they provide will be kept confidential.
Personal health data in particular may be very sensitive, and the
consequences of inappropriate disclosure can be grave. To protect
users, sites that collect personal data should
* take reasonable steps to prevent unauthorised access to or use
of personal data...
* make it easy for users to review personal data they have given
and to update it or correct it when appropriate
* adopt reasonable mechanisms to trace how personal data is
used...
* tell how the site stores users' personal data and for how long it
stores that data
* assure that when personal data is "de-identified" (that is, when
the user's name, email address, or other data that might identify him
312 See generally Allen Buchanan, Trust in Managed Care Organizations, 10 KENNEDY INST.
ETHICS J. 189 (2000) (discussing the nature of trust in the physician-patient relationship).
313 Edward G. Howe, Leaving Laputa: What Doctors Aren 't Taught about Informed Consent, I I
J. CLINICAL ETHICS 3, 11 (2000).
314 See generally supra text accompanying note 58.
315 See AM. MED. ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, IV, at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2001) ("A physician shall respect the rights
of patients, colleagues, and other health professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences and
privacy within the constraints of the law.").
316 See, for example, URAC's health web site accreditation program, at http://www.urac.org/
websiteaccreditation.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2001). URAC's Health Web Site Standards, Version
1.0, are available at http://www.urac.org/programs/technologyhws.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2001 ).
317 See, e.g., Janet Wells, Wrong MDs Got Patient Records; Psychiatric Privacy Violated, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 30, 2000 at A13; O'Harrow, supra note 235. See generally CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND.,
REPORT ON THE PRIVACY POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF HEALTH WEB SITES, at
http://ehealth.chcf.org/index.cfm?section=Privacy (last visited Nov. 23, 2001).
318 See generally Gostin, supra note 68, at 513-16.
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or her has been removed from the file) it cannot be linked back to
the user.
3 19
D. INTERSECTION OF INFORMED CONSENT AND CONSENT TO DISCLOSE
Although an abundance of case law details the duty of confidentiality a
physician owes to her patient,320 the doctrine of informed consent has occupied most
of the conceptual space concerning data flow between physician and patient. Despite
the doctrine's limitations detailed herein, the overall trend has been to increase the
flow of rich data between patient and physician.
One of the few reported cases to discuss the intersection between the duty of
confidentiality and informed consent is Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center at
Princeton.321 Plaintiff, who was also a member of the medical staff of the defendant
hospital, was diagnosed with AIDS, a fact that swiftly became common knowledge
within the hospital. The hospital's policy required that the patient be counseled prior
to the administration of an HIV test, specifying that the blanket consent form used
upon admission should not be used for this purpose. The patient had signed an
informed consent that provided, "I ... hereby give my consent... to have my blood
tested for antibodies to HTLV III Virus as ordered by my physician. The results of
the test will be reported only to the ordering physician." 322 This provision was
inaccurate on its face because of the hospital's charting policies, which allowed for
placement of laboratory test results on the patient's chart while not imposing any
limitations on the availability and access of the chart within the institution. The court
concluded:
[T]he failure of the Medical Center and [the] Director of the
Department of Laboratories, who were together responsible for
developing the misstated Informed Consent form, the counseling
procedure and implementation of the charting protocol,. to take
reasonable steps to maintain the confidentiality of plaintiffs
medical records, while plaintiff was a patient, was a breach of the
Medical Center's duty and obligation to keep such records
confidential. 323
The message of cases like Behringer is that healthcare institutions and care
providers must adopt a more holistic view of their responsibilities to the data and
communications related to the patient. Predetermined, mechanistic occasions of
"consent" are inadequate. Rather, dialog, choice, consequences of disclosure and
consent must be ongoing and continually updated to reflect new data flowing into the
record.
If the common law of consent and confidentiality are showing signs of edging
closer together under a general umbrella of informational autonomy, it will be some
319 INTERNET HEALTHCARE COALITION, eHealth Code of Ethics (2000), at
http://www.ihealthcoalition.org/ethics/ehcode.html; HEALTH ON THE NET FOUNDATION, HonCode, at
http://www.hon.ch/HONcode/Conduct.html (1997); HI-ETHICS, INC., Health Internet Ethics: Ethical
Principles For Offering Internet Health Services to Consumers, at http://www.hiethics.org/
Principles/index.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
320 See cases discussed at supra note 58.
321 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991).
322 Id. at 1271.
323 Id. at 1273-74.
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time before it becomes clear whether the PIHI rules will hinder or heed that
interaction. The basic philosophy behind PIHI as stated in the preamble to the rule is
"to provide an opportunity for and to encourage more informed discussions between
patients and providers about how protected health information will be used and
disclosed within the health care system." 324 Operationally, DHHS believes that PIHI
consent and authorization will have a non-contentious relationship with traditional
consent law:
The Privacy Rule establishes a federal requirement that most
doctors, hospitals, or other health care providers obtain a patient's
written consent before using or disclosing the patient's personal
health information to carry out treatment, payment, or health care
operations (TPO). Today, many health care providers, for
professional or ethical reasons, routinely obtain a patient's consent
for disclosure of information to insurance companies or for other
purposes. The Privacy Rule builds on these practices by
establishing a uniform standard for certain health care providers to
obtain their patients' consent for uses and disclosures of health
information about the patient to carry out TPO.325
Indeed, there are several potential positive intersections between PIHI and
informed consent law and practice. First, HIPAA-EDI is likely to fuel an overall
review of consents and authorizations within healthcare institutions. This process
will in part be designed to examine the extent to which other documents can be
efficiently combined in PIHI-mandated documents. The process also will be tasked
with ensuring that PIHI consents and authorizations are not combined with
documents that contain provisions inconsistent with the PIHI rules. 326 It is highly
likely that this review will lead to the redesign and possible standardization of related
forms. For example, both consent and authorization instruments must be in "plain
language." 327 Furthermore, PIHI authorization, and to a somewhat lesser extent,
consent rules, are specific as to the inclusion of certain patient rights. For example,
PIHI mandates that the form state the patient's right to revoke the consent 328 or
authorization. 329 A right of revocation exists in common law informed consent;
however, it is an issue that has seldom been discussed in that context. 330  If
324 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, Final Rule, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82,462, 82,474 (Dec. 28, 2000) (emphasis added).
325 GUIDANCE/Q&As, supra note 37.
326 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.506(b)(3), 164.506(b)(4), 164.508(b)(1)(ii), 164.508(b)(3)
(2001).
327 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.506(c), 164.508(c)(2) (2001).
328 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(5) (2001).
329 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(v) (2001).
330 Cf. Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 26, 31-32 (Wis. 1999):
We reject the notion that the onset of a procedure categorically forecloses a
patient's withdrawal of consent. To be sure, at some point in virtually every
medical procedure a patient reaches a point from which there is no return.
However, that point need not be arbitrarily created at the commencement of
treatment. Rather it varies with the nature and circumstances of the individual
procedure and continues so long as there exist alternative viable modes of
medical treatment.
In this case, a cesarean delivery at all times remained a viable medical
alternative to the VBAC [vaginal delivery] and ultimately that is how [the
defendant] delivered [the baby]. Unlike the circuit court, we determine that since
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institutions redesign their informed consent forms to align them with PIHI disclosure
provisions, we would likely see the insertion of related clauses in informed consent
instruments. Beyond any specific example of a substantive change that might be
incorporated into an informed consent form is the overall higher level of scrutiny that
will be applied to consents and authorizations because of the required HIPAA
compliance systems.
One obvious implication of this HIPAA-EDI induced reevaluation of consent
and authorization instruments and processes will be the reinforcement of the view
that the informed consent process is driven more by institutional health providers
than by individual medical professionals. The overwhelming majority of courts
which have considered the question have declined to impose upon hospitals a general
duty to obtain a patient's informed consent, 331 essentially refusing to extend the
corporate negligence doctrine 332 to such facts. One oft-cited rationale for this
position which holds that, "the hospital does not know the patient's medical history,
nor the details of the particular surgery to be performed," 333 seems suspect in a
corporate hospital environment dominated by all-seeing, all-knowing information
systems. Even courts that have applied the general rule requiring informed consent
endorse exceptions based on the institution acting as the physician's agent, 334
assumption of the consent duty by the institution pursuant to federally regulated
clinical investigations 335 and, perhaps most telling for our present context, the
hospital's failure to comply with its own internal policies and JCAHO standards.3 36
As has happened with Institutional Review Boards assuming consent responsibilities
in human experimentation cases, 3 37 institutions forced to regularize and centralize
their systems because of HIPAA-EDI likewise will assume more informed consent-
related duties. It seems inevitable that soon the exceptions will swallow up the
general rule, and the institutional provider will become the default defendant in
informed consent cases. 338
The second highly probable outcome of the intersection of informed consent and
PIHI consent and authorization is an improvement in documentation and record-
keeping. In the case of both consent and authorization instruments, the healthcare
entity must "document and retain" signed consents;339 however, only in the case of
alternative viable modes of medical treatment existed, [the plaintiff] was still able
to withdraw her consent to the VBAC. Having determined that [the plaintiff] had
withdrawn her consent to the VBAC, we must now examine the effect, if any, of
that withdrawal. The [plaintiffs] contend that her withdrawal both removed [the
defendant's] authority to continue with the VEAC and obligated him to conduct
another informed consent discussion. We agree.
331 See, e.g., Wells v. Storey, 792 So. 2d 1034, 1044 (Ala. 1999); Bryant v. HCA Health Scrvs.,
15 S.W.3d 804, 807 (Tenn. 2000). See also Giese v. Stice, 567 N.W.2d 156, 162-65 (Neb. 1997)
(discussing how other courts have addressed the issue).
332 The doctrine is based on Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (111.
1965) and its progeny.
333 Krane v. St. Anthony Hosp. Sys., 738 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. App. 1987).
334 See, e.g., Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446, 459 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that absent agency
relationship with physician, hospital had no duty to obtain patient's informed consent to surgery).
335 See, e.g., Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214, 1214 (II1. App. Ct. 1995); Friter v. Iolab
Corp., 607 A.2d 1111, 1113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
336 Butler v. S. Fulton Med. Ctr., 452 S.E.2d 768, 772 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
337 See generally 46 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-46.124 (2001) and 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.101-56.124 (2001) for
the obligations of institutional review boards supervising human experimentation.
338 Recall the discussion above as to institutional liability generally, supra text accompanying
note 240.
339 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.506(b)(6), 164.508(b)(6) (2001).
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authorizations must the entity supply a copy to the patient.340 As discussed in Part
VI, increased documentation, coupled with federally-mandated patient access to the
medical record, will shift the balance towards plaintiffs in malpractice actions and in
the informed consent subset.
The third major impact of PIHI on informed consent will be a function of the
growth of data-mining and analytic systems leveraging the HIPAA-EDI architecture.
Institutions will be increasingly able to analyze informed consent patterns and map
them to, for example, physician-performance analyses and patient complaints. In the
case of adverse events, the systems will lead to more robust peer-review reporting
and scrutiny. Longer term, as computer surveillance systems come online, there will
be a growth in proactive systems as they invoke specific, even personalized, risk
disclosure content (delivered via video and online) that relates to the treatment or
medication delivered to an individual patient.34'
The intersection between PIHI consent and authorization and traditional
informed consent risk disclosure has the potential to improve consent and patient
choice by stimulating provider reforms of both the process and content of the latter.
Despite this, the intersection also has potential negative effects. First, the PIHI
consent-authorization dichotomy with its attendant endorsement of front-end loaded
consent procedures seems to have learned little from the Hall-Wolf colloquy on the
timing and nature of informed consents in the managed care setting. 342 The PIHI
message is that consent to disclose may be one-time, comprehensive and non-
negotiable. Leaving aside the question whether that is appropriate for treatment-
related privacy consent, the PIHI model may well encourage providers to use a
similar approach for consent to treatment risk-disclosures. 343
Second, the PIHI regulations frequently emphasize process over substance, and
encourage relatively pro forma instruments that presumably will increasingly be
delivered in electronic format. 344 At least in the case of consent to TPO, the patient
may be given little option but to click "I Agree." 345 Rosoff has noted the efficiency,
cost-saving, comprehensiveness and self-documenting features of computer-mediated
informed consent models, which he refers to as computer-based patient education
devices. 346 While he speculates that "use of cutting-edge technology to educate
patients could bring us closer to the goal of having doctor and patient collaborate as
340 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(d)(2) (2001).
341 See generally Arnold J. Rosoff, Informed Consent in the Electronic Age, 25 AM. J.L. &
MED. 367 (1999) (discussing how technology is impacting doctor-patient relations).
342 See Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent, 31 GA. L. REV. 511 (1997);
Susan M. Wolf, Toward a Systemic Theory of Informed Consent in Managed Care, 35 HOUS. L. REV.
1631 (1999)
343 Cf. Wolf, supra note 342, at 1639.
A systemic theory of informed consent must place treatment decisions in a
broader framework. Questions of disclosure and consent arise at a number of
points: when a worker takes a job offering a certain health care package, when
the worker selects or reselects among health plans and enrolls in one, when the
subscriber then chooses a primary care physician or clinic, and finally, when the
patient consents to treatment. To reduce the informed consent problem to the
question of what should happen at the last of these points fails to recognize the
profoundly systemic nature of the problem of information transfer and consent.
344 "The covered entity may choose to obtain and store consents in paper or electronic form,
provided that the consent meets all of the requirements under the Privacy Rule, including that it be
signed by the individual. Paper is not required." GUIDANCE/Q&As, supra note 37.
345 See supra text accompanying notes 264-268.
346 Rosoff, supra note 341, at 368.
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near-equals on the patient's health care," 34 7 Rosoff also reminds us that "there is a
tendency, whenever a transaction is routinized and reduced to a ritual, for the ritual to
stifle the dynamic human interaction. Even assuming that the requisite information is
conveyed to the patient in a complete and understandable manner, some human
interaction of the social, relational quality of the encounter may be lost."348
Stated somewhat differently, true informed "choice" suggests a movement from
professional autonomy to patient autonomy or, more positively, to sharing data and a
trusting dialog. Pro forma, technologically-mediated mechanistic "consent" could,
however, herald an unfortunate increase in both professional and personal
dependence, overtaken by a somewhat Orwellian institutional autonomy. In that
scenario, patients increasingly will look to outside sources such as Internet advice
sites and infomediaries for the rich data that they require prior to making a choice and
giving consent.
E. CONSENT TO TECHNOLOGICALLY-MEDIATED HEALTHCARE
The previous section examined technologically-mediated consent to traditional
care and treatment. But what if it is the healthcare itself that is to be delivered via
technology?3 49  Several states now mandate specific, additional consent in such
cases.350  For example, a California statute requires an additional consent for
telemedicine, holding the "health care practitioner who has ultimate authority over
the care or primary diagnosis of the patient" responsible for providing verbal and
written notice that:
(1) The patient or the patient's legal representative retains the
option to withhold or withdraw consent at any time without
affecting the right to future care or treatment nor risking the loss or
withdrawal of any program benefits to which the patient or the
patient's legal representative would otherwise be entitled.
(2) A description of the potential risks, consequences, and benefits
of telemedicine.
(3) All existing confidentiality protections apply.
(4) All existing laws regarding patient access to medical
information and copies of medical records apply.
(5) Dissemination of any patient identifiable images or information
from the telemedicine interaction to researchers or other entities
shall not occur without the consent of the patient. 35'
These statutes, focusing on the primary physician operating within the
jurisdiction, tend to duck many of the issues presented in cases upon which multiple
physicians are consulting. For example, the California statute imposes a duty on the
primary (presumably originating) physician to disclose telemedicine risks. Yet, the
347 Id. at 384.
348 Id.
349 See generally Judith F. Daar & Spencer Koerner, Telemedicine: Legal and Practical
Implications, 19 WHITTIER L. REV. 3 (1997) (providing a brief history of the development of
telemedicine, as well as a discussion of its current and potential future uses). See also Jeffrey L.
Rensberger, Choice of Law. Medical Malpractice, and Telemedicine: The Present Diagnosis with a
Prescription for the Future, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 31 (2000).
350 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3602(A) (2000). See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.5975
(2000); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-8505 (2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 6804 (West 1999).
351 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2290.5(c) (West 2001).
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statute does not preclude a common law informed consent duty being imposed on the
remote physician, nor does it necessarily follow that the originating physician
remains responsible for disclosure of non-telemedicine specific risks. As a general
rule, a remote physician does not have a duty to provide informed consent where she
has no established relationship with the patient, but rather a consulting one with the
patient's primary physician. 3S2 Equally, an originating physician who has referred on
the patient but is not involved in subsequent treatment will generally not face
exposure to informed consent liability. 353 One New York case summed up the
multiple physician scenarios as follows:
A patient's personal physician bears the responsibility to assure the
welfare of his patient in all phases of his treatment. Such treatment
must, of necessity, include diagnosis and the prescription of a
course of treatment by others, such as specialists. To the degree
that the physician provides such treatment directly, he obviously
bears a duty to advise his patients of the risk. Further, if he refers
his patient to another physician and retains a degree of
participation, by way of control, consultation or otherwise, his
responsibility continues to properly advise his patients with respect
to the treatment to be performed by the referred physician .... On
the same basis, once the patient is referred to another physician for
treatment, the second physician also has a duty to inform the
patient.354
In purely online physician-patient relationships, it will be natural for providers
to build automated consent mechanisms. If mechanistic consent rather than dialog
and choice become the norm, the growing temptation will be to provide voluminous
online risk data (patient-incurred sorting costs notwithstanding) accompanied by a
simple "I Agree/Disagree" ".consent." This scenario has been playing out in general
B2C ecommerce, with online vendors stocking their sites with highly favorable terms
and conditions of use, including carefully chosen choice of forum or arbitration
clauses and suspect privacy statements. 35 5 In the case of hard goods ordered online,
the actual terms of the contract are conditions subsequent that "arrive" with the order.
Seeing a similarity to the issue raised by software licenses literally hidden within
shrink-wrap, 356 courts initially approved of such "click-wrap" agreements. 357 Recent
352 O'Neal v. Hammer, 953 P.2d 561, 568 (Haw. 1998):
Accordingly, we hold that a consulting physician does not owe a duty to the
patient to warn of the inherent risks of a proposed treatment or surgery. A physician
tendering a second opinion, on the other hand, has an obligation to inform the patient
of the nature of the proposed treatment or surgery, its risks, and alternatives.
353 See, e.g., Halley v. Birbiglia, 458 N.E.2d 710, 715 (Mass. 1983) (holding that physician
could not be held liable under informed consent doctrine for injuries sustained by infant where
physician was not the admitting or attending physician, was not the physician who formally ordered the
arteriogram and was not one of the medical personnel who spoke with the infant's parents and assured
them of safety of test).
354 Prooth v. Wallsh, 432 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (citations omitted).
355 See generally Margaret J. Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND.
L.J. 1125, 1152 (2000) (discussing the effect of new types of contracts on our understanding of
contractual commitment and on the law that determines which commitments are binding).
356 See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
357 See, e.g., Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1999). See also
Hotmail Corp. v. Van Money Pie, Inc., No. C98-20064 JW, C-98 JW PVT ENE, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10729, *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug 16, 1998); In re RealNetworks, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 2000 U.S.
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opinions, however, have exhibited more skepticism. 358 A recent United States
District Court, while not necessarily opposed to click-wrap assent, did hold that a
"browse-wrap" agreement-browsing or downloading from a site containing terms of
use that were never specifically brought to the consumer's attention or assented to-
was unenforceable. 359
State telemedicine consent statutes might appear to be a step in the right
direction by calling for meaningful disclosure of additional risks that the online
treatment might involve. These provisions, however, are more closely tied to
growing state interests in regulating online care due to fears of unauthorized practice
and medical board disciplinary proceedings. 36 0 They tend neither to address the issue
of pure eHealth interactions, where there was no in-state originating
physician-primarily because such interactions are viewed as suspect under state
licensure statutes-nor to detail the content or substance of an informed consent to
technologically-mediated care.
As noted above, the California statutory mandate is to disclose a "description of
the potential risks, consequences, and benefits of telemedicine." 361 That mandate
merely begs the question as to the risks of either traditional telemedicine or more
advanced eHealth encounters. Spielberg has argued that physicians should discuss
the ramifications of communicating electronically with patients and obtain relevant
informed consent to the technological mediation. 362  Such informed consent
presumably would involve notifying the patient that email communications are not
intrinsically secure. Patients should be warned that "operator error" frequently could
lead to emails being unexpectedly forwarded, for example-not that such errors
would be tolerated legally. Furthermore, the American Medical Informatics
Association (AMIA) has cogently argued that the informed consent mechanism also
should "[p]rovide instructions for when and how to escalate to phone calls and office
visits" and "[d]escribe security mechanisms in place." 363 This latter issue is perhaps
the most pressing issue to resolve in setting the legal standard.3 64
Dist, LEXIS 6584, at *1 (N.D. I11. May 11, 2000).
358 See, e.g., America Online, Inc., v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2001); Williams v. America Online, Inc., No. 00-0962, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS I1, at *1 (Mass.
Sup. Feb. 8,2001).
359 Netscape argues that the mere act of downloading indicates assent. However,
downloading is hardly an unambiguous indication of assent. The primary purpose
of downloading is to obtain a product, not to assent to an agreement. In contrast,
clicking on an icon stating "I assent" has no meaning or purpose other than to
indicate such assent. Netscape's failure to require users of SmartDownload to
indicate assent to its license as a precondition to downloading and using its
software is fatal to its argument that a contract has been formed.
Specht v. Netscape Communications. Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585, 589 (2001).
360 See generally Ross D. Silverman, Regulating Medical Practice in the Cyber Age: Issues and
Challenges for State Medical Boards, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 255 (2000) (examining the effect computers
and the Iniernet have on the ability of state medical boards to regulate the practice of medicine, and the
responses at the state and federal level to these technological developments).
361 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2290.5(c) (West 2001).
362 Alissa R. Spielberg, On Call and Online: Sociohistorical. Legal, and Ethical Implications of
E-mailfor the Patient-Physician Relationship, 280 JAMA 1353, 1353 (1998).
363 Beverly Kane & Daniel Z. Sands, Guidelines for the Clinical Use of Electronic Mail with Patients,
5 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICs Ass'N 104, 106 (1998).
364 Indeed, there is a growing consensus that regular, unsecured email should not be used for
anything but the most routine of physician-patient communications. See Press Release, MEDEM, "Avoid
Standard Un-Secure E-mailfor Online Communications with Patients, "Says Nation's Leading Medical
Societies and the AMA, Top Malpractice Carriers and Medem Groups, Apr. 30, 2001, available at
http://www.medem.com/Corporate/press.
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In many ways, therefore, the PIHI consent and disclosure requirements do little
but reflect the problems facing modern informed consent. Is it really about
mechanistic consent, or does it truly stimulate dialog, trust and choice? Will
technologically-mediated care result in less meaningful physician-patient interaction
and more patient dependency on outsourced standard-form information or data
furnished by third-parties? Yet, the PIHI rules also suggest some positives.
Reinforcing and standardizing consent procedures, which will frequently share space
in compound documents that attract considerable and continual compliance-based
scrutiny, will sharpen the overall process, and an information architecture that makes
data collecting, analysis and peer-review more likely, are positive indications for the
future of both the doctrine and its operational aspects.
VI. MALPRACTICE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS OF NEW PRIVACY AND
SECURITY REGIMES
This section will concentrate on some of the most practical ramifications of the
new privacy and security protections applied to PHI, examining how the patient
medical record will be protected and expanded by federal and, to an extent state law,
and the effect of this new records paradigm on malpractice litigation. It is likely the
HIPAA-EDI structure, its privacy and security rules and state-based fellow travelers,
will lead to increased error reporting, especially to patients, and that this will reduce
the false negatives currently seen in medical malpractice litigation. Medical
malpractice plaintiffs will find themselves in a much more favorable position
following the various regulatory and statutory reforms and will be able to exploit
some of the new protections for litigation purposes. In this context, this section
suggests that the existence of a comprehensive, secure patient record will assist
plaintiffs in the preparation and trial of their cases, in large part because of legally
guaranteed rights of access to and correction of their records. Finally, a
comprehensive patient record will permit plaintiffs to identify additional defendants
and suggest additional theories of the case.
The overall thesis of increased malpractice-related risk reallocation is somewhat
dependent on three assumptions. First is that in our current system, false negatives
both exist and considerably outnumber false positive results. In general, these false
negatives occur when deserving plaintiffs lose and false positives occur when
undeserving plaintiffs win. False negatives are caused by either by a failure to
correlate a bad result with possible malpractice (i.e., an undiscovered adverse event
or an adverse event uncorrelated to medical error) or a failure of factual proof (e.g.,
plaintiff failing to prove that defendant made a particular statement, that a particular
medical intervention occurred prior to a symptom appearing or that a medication was
given in a particular dosage). 365 This assumption finds sustenance in the findings of
false negatives in the Harvard Study discussed above. 366
Second, this argument assumes that HIPAA-EDI and other legal, economic and
technological forces will lead healthcare institutions and individual physicians to
adopt longitudinal CPRs and that these records will be comprehensive and linked
365 A third species of false negative may be caused by a failure in the plaintiff's substantive
case, such as a failure in expert testimony to prove that the defendant failed to comply with
professional standards. This is less of a system error and generally will be remedied by allowing the
plaintiff more latitude in proving negligence, such as by the utilization of practice guidelines. See
supra text accompanying note 208.
366 See sources cited supra note 94.
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with external (e.g., non-employee physician) records relating to the patient.367
Third, it is axiomatic that the plaintiff usually will benefit from any increase in
access to defendant-generated information both prior to and during trial. Not only
does this seem to be intuitively accurate, but may also be proven by examining well-
known tort law correlates. For example, in fact-patterns where courts have decided to
shift the risk reallocation model more in the favor of plaintiffs, they consistently
impose explanatory or exculpatory burdens on defendants who they consider to have
the best or cheaper information about what actually occurred.368 This has played out
in medical malpractice "conspiracy of silence" type cases where the court has applied
res ipsa loquitur,369 pharmaceutical market-share cases 370 and, in a few jurisdictions,
strict products liability design defect cases.371 Obviously, cases will arise where a
CPR entry will absolve a physician or institution from malpractice liability and
therefore avoid a false positive. Equally, computer surveillance systems, at least in
their infancy, may themselves generate some false positives. 372 Overall, however,
plaintiffs will benefit from increased and increasingly more robust data.
367 See generally Christopher D. Mount et a]., An Integrated Electronic Health Record and
Information System for Australia?, 172 MED. J. AUSTL. 25 (2000) (contending that an integrated health
record and information system would provide benefits for clinicians and patients through better clinical
care, and for the healthcare system through better data for policy development and resource allocation).
368 Terry, supra note 188, at 723.
369 See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spanga.d, 154 P.2d 687, 691 (Cal. 1944) (holding res ipsa charge proper
despite plaintiffs inability, due to anesthesia, to specify what instrumentality, under exclusive control
of which defendant, caused the injury). For a recent summary of jurisdictional attitudes towards the
application of res ipsa loquitur in medical malpractice cases, particularly those requiring expert
testimony as to the standard of care, see Seavers v. Methodist Med. Ctr., 9 S.W.3d 86, 93-95 (Tenn.
1999).
370 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs, 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (finding that pharmaceutical
manufacturers composing a "substantial percentage" of the drug market could each be liable for an
amount proportionate to its market share, absent proof that it could not have produced the DES
consumed by plaintiffs mother). See also Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Cal. 1948) (holding that
the exculpatory burden applied where plaintiff could not prove which of two hunters' bullets had
injured him).
371 Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455 (Cal. 1978) (adopting a risk-benefit analysis
test for strict products liability design defect cases with the burden of proof allocated to defendant
manufacturer).
The allocation of such burden is particularly significant in this context
inasmuch as this court's product liability decisions, from Greenman to Cronin,
have repeatedly emphasized that one of the principal purposes behind the strict
product liability doctrine is to relieve an injured plaintiff of many of the onerous
evidentiary burdens inherent in a negligence cause of action. Because most of the
evidentiary matters which may be relevant to the determination of the adequacy
of a product's design under the "risk-benefit" standard e. g., the feasibility and
cost of alternative designs are similar to issues typically presented in a negligent
design case and involve technical matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the
manufacturer, we conclude that once the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing
that the injury was proximately caused by the product's design, the burden should
appropriately shift to the defendant to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that
the product is not defective. Moreover, inasmuch as this conclusion flows from
our determination that the fundamental public policies embraced in Greenman
dictate that a manufacturer who seeks to escape liability for an injury proximately
caused by its product's design on a risk- benefit theory should bear the burden of
persuading the trier of fact that its product should not be judged defective, the
defendant's burden is one affecting the burden of proof, rather than simply the
burden of producing evidence.
Id. See generally Terry, supra note 188, at 726-30.
372 See Luiza A.B. Camacho & Haya R. Rubin, Assessment of the Validity and Reliability of
Three Systems of Medical Record Screening for Quality of Care Assessment, 36 MED. CARE 748, 748
(1998).
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A. MALPRACTICE LITIGATION AND THE CPR
The written medical record is of utmost importance in medical malpractice
litigation.373 It is the initial "script" of the case, delineating the timeline and parties
involved in patient care and dictating many of the discovery requests that will follow.
Thereafter, as a perceived island of verity surrounded by accusation, argument and
conflicting testimony, the tangible record has a powerful impact on juries. The
traditional paper patient record, however, lacks integrity. Medical records are not
always complete or centralized and reported cases tell us about records that have
"mysteriously vanished," 37 4 altered so as to be unreadable 375 or altered with the
express intent of avoiding malpractice liability.376 Ten years ago the IOM described
the CPR of the future as follows:
[A]s an electronic patient record that resides in a system
specifically designed to support users through availability of
complete and accurate data, practitioner reminders and alerts,
clinical decision support systems, links to bodies of medical
knowledge, and other aids. This definition encompasses a broader
view of the patient record than is current today, moving from a
location or device for keeping track of patient care events to a
resource with much enhanced utility in patient care (including the
ability to provide an accurate longitudinal account of care), in
management of the health care system, and in extension of
knowledge.
3 77
For litigators, therefore, the CPR compares most favorably to its paper
antecedent. A comprehensive, time-stamped record coupled with the JCAHO-
mandated duty to disclose adverse events will constitute good evidence of "fraudulent
concealment" so as to resist a statute of limitations defense. 378 The CPR is "white-
out" proof, as any alterations to the record will be logged and previous versions will
be available for comparison-subject to the institution's document retention
policy.379  Even more importantly, the modern CPR will be complete and
373 See AM. HEALTH INFO. MGMT. ASS'N, Practice Brief: Definition of the Health Record for
Legal Purposes, at http://www.ahima.org/journal/pb/01.l0.2.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2001). See
generally Robert Gray Palmer, Altered and 'Lost'Medical Records, 35 TRIAL 31 (1989) (contending
that evidence of spoliation of records in medical negligence actions can strengthen a client's case).
374 Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331, 344 (1994) (finding evidence regarding
physician's alteration of patient's records supported award of punitive damages).
375 Gordon v. Willis Knighton Med. Ctr., 661 So. 2d 991, 993 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that
while the entry in the hospital's emergency room records indicate when the patient arrived, the entry
had been altered in such a manner that no one could determine the original entry).
376 Dimora v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 683 N.E.2d 1175, 1182 (1996) (holding that evidence
submitted was sufficient to raise a factual question requiring determination by a jury as to whether
progress and discharge notes were falsified or inaccurately reported to avoid liability for medical
malpractice). See also Robinson v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 732 So. 2d 204 (Miss. 1999). See
generally Lynn Wilson Marks, Medical Malpractice: Case Management and Other Guidelines, 7 J.
FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAM. 11 (1994); Robert L. Prosser, Alteration of Medical Records Submitted
for Medicolegal Review, 267 JAMA, 2630, 2630 (1992) ("Issues related to alterations of medical
records have surfaced in four of the 10 medicolegal cases I have reviewed in the last 12 months.").
377 COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD, supra note 137, at 2-3.
378 See. e.g., Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tenn. 1998). See also Barry R. Furrow,
Doctors' Dirty Little Secrets: The Dark Side of Medical Privacy, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 283 (1998)
(discussing physician duties regarding patient privacy rights).
379 See generally Kimberly D. Richard, Note and Comment, Electronic Evidence: To Produce
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comprehensive, built from self-documenting inputs such as POE380 and barcode-
based systems. It will record and time-stamp all interactions with the patient and log
the identity of involved careproviders and the information they had available (e.g.,
the dispensing of a contraindicated drug by another care provider) at an exact point in
time.
B. HIPAA-EDI PRIVACY AND SECURITY FOR THE CPR
If the CPR and related parts of the modern IT-driven hospital or physician office
database and expert systems suggest the promise of litigating from a comprehensive,
all-knowing record, then the HIPAA-EDI Security NPRM should guarantee the data's
integrity and make objections to its introduction into evidence extremely difficult. 38'
The Security NPRM requirements are divided into three broad areas: (1)
administrative procedures, such as policies, plans, audit and training;382 (2) physical
security, such as access control and disaster recovery systems; 383 and, (3) technical
security, such as authentication and encryption. 384 Not surprisingly, many of these
requirements concentrate on dangers posed by external forces such as hackers and
viral infection;385 however, there are also specific rules which make a CPR operating
under HIPAA-EDI a more potent courtroom weapon. For example, a data backup
plan,386 strong authorization policies 387 and access controls 388 will all guarantee the
integrity of a record required for litigation. Furthermore, the systems must use data
authentication and user identification, 389 and establish processes for tracking and
auditing system access. 390 Not only will the CPR be secure, but precise information
will be available as to who interacted with it, and when. Care provider interaction
with patient documents will also be authenticated and audited via the use of digital
signatures, 391 which HIPAA-EDI will include within its regulatory system.392
While the Security NPRM guarantees the integrity of the CPR, the PIHI rules
may have some serious litigation implications of their own. Specifically, some
fascinating questions arise concerning the possible effect of the access and
accounting rules contained within the privacy regulation.
or Not to Produce, That is the Question, 21 WHITTIER L. REv. 463 (1999) (examining the impact new
technology has on clients, attorneys, courts and the legal system in general).
380 See supra text accompanying note 125.
381 The CPR is hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, but admissible under the business
records exception in Rule 803(6), subject to compliance with conditions therein. See, e.g., Welsh v.
Galen of Va., Inc., 2001 WL 502123, *1 (Ky. App. May 11,2001); Powell v. Catholic Med. Ctr., 749
A.2d 301 (N.H. 2000); Patterson v. Hutchens, 529 N.W.2d 561 (N.D. 1995).
382 Security and Electronic Signatures; Proposed Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 43,241, 43,266 (Aug. 12,
1998) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 142.308(a)).
383 Security and Electronic Signatures, Proposed Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 43,267.
384 Security and Electronic Signatures, Proposed Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 43,268.
385 See, e.g., Diane Levick, Insurers At Risk Online. Study Says, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 7,
2001, at E2.
386 Security and Electronic Signatures, Proposed Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 43,266.
387 Security and Electronic Signatures, Proposed Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 43,266.
388 Security and Electronic Signatures, Proposed Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 43,268.
389 Security and Electronic Signatures, Proposed Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 43,268.
390 Security and Electronic Signatures, Proposed Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 43,268.
391 See, e.g., VERISIGN, Healthcare Authentication Services, at http://www.verisign.com/
enterprise/healthcare/authentication.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2001). See also AM. MED. ASS'N, AMA
Internet ID: Protecting Your Identity Online, ht www.ama-assn.org/internetid (last modified Oct. 25,
2001).
392 Currently, this regulation is to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 143.310, but likely will be spun off
into a separate rule.
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Not surprisingly, the healthcare entity may disclose most PHI to the patient
herself393 and is permitted to disclose such information pursuant to legal process. 394
Additionally, however, the PIHI regulation gives the patient "a right of access to
inspect and obtain a copy of protected health information about the individual." 39 5
There are only a few discrete exceptions to this rule, such as for a psychotherapist's
impressionistic "process notes." 396  Importantly, the right of access is limited to
"protected health information about the individual in a designated record set," 3 97 and
a provider will be able to keep peer-review and related information out of a
"designated record set." 39
8
Although the provider may charge a reasonable fee 399 and demand that the
request is in writing, 400 ultimately, the provider has little choice but to comply in a
timely fashion401 with a patient's request. While not an example of self-executing
adverse error reporting-in contrast to, for example, JCAHO mandated disclosure to
the patient4 2-the plaintiff who has suffered an adverse event is likely to use this
PIHI right of access as the first step in an inquiry as to exactly what went wrong and
thereafter, whether there had been malpractice. 40 3
As the potential for litigation over, for example, an adverse event becomes
clearer, a plaintiffs attorney, working through the patient's PIHI rights, may also be
able to exploit other provisions in the regulations prior to any formal discovery. The
accounting or audit provisions404 will be of only limited use because they exempt
TPO disclosures. 405 Notwithstanding, in some cases a plaintiffs attorney might find
393 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(1)(i) (2001).
394 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2001).
395 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1) (2001).
396 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)( )(i) (2001). The PIHI regulation uses the term psychotherapy notes,
as defined in 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001).
397 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1) (2001).
398 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 defines the "designated record set" as:
A group of records maintained by or for a covered entity that is:
(i) The medical records and billing records about individuals maintained by
or for a covered health care provider;
(ii) The enrollment, 'payment, claims adjudication, and case or medical
management record systems maintained by or for a health plan; or.
(iii) Used, in whole or in part, by or for the covered entity to make decisions
about individuals.
Presumably the only (thin) argument that could be raised by the individual is the whether the peer-
review material could be included under (iii). Presumably, a provider could be at risk it fails to
segregate out its records as suggested by the designated set language.
399 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(c)(4) (2001). Undefined in PIHI, the reasonable fee under the Montana
health privacy statute is addressed as follows:
A reasonable fee for providing health care information may not exceed 50 cents
for each page for a paper copy or photocopy. A reasonable fee may include an
administrative fee that may not exceed $15 for searching and handling recorded
health care information.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-540 (2000).
400 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(b)(1) (2001).
401 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(c)(3) (2001).
402 See supra text accompanying note 174.
403 The window will close to an extent as litigation looms closer because 45 C.F.R. §
164.528(l)(ii) allows the provider to deny a request to access "Information compiled in reasonable
anticipation of, or for use in, a civil, criminal, or administrative action or proceeding."
404 45 C.F.R. § 164.528 (2001) ("An individual has a right to receive an accounting of
disclosures of protected health information made by a covered entity in the six years prior to the date
on which the accounting is requested.").
405 45 C.F.R. § 164.528(a)(1)(i) (2001).
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value in finding out who else has been looking at the plaintiffs records.
Perhaps of more value in the context of contemplated litigation is the
amendment provision whereby "[a]n individual has the right to have a covered entity
amend protected health information." 406 Given the power of the medical record when
placed in front of a jury, the plaintiff may well have an interest in having "her story"
portrayed to better reinforce her theory of liability. The "covered entity may deny an
individual's request for amendment, if it determines that the protected health
information or record that is the subject of the request . . . [i]s accurate and
complete."407 Yet, outside of the context of formally initiated litigation, the provider
may not see the purpose of the patient's proposed amendment. Even if the request is
denied, a plaintiffs attorney may gather useful intelligence from the required reason
for denial. 408 The patient also has the right to add a "Statement of disagreement" to
the record.4 09
C. STATE RULES WITH PROCESS IMPLICATIONS
Several states have asserted their own interests in the modem medical record.
For example, the California legislature has determined that "every person having
ultimate responsibility for decisions respecting his or her own health care also
possesses a concomitant right of access to complete information respecting his or her
condition and care provided."410 Similarly, the Montana legislature has opined that
"patients need access to their own health care information as a matter of fairness, to
enable them to make informed decisions about their health care and to correct
inaccurate or incomplete information about themselves." 411
The PIHI rules do not fully preempt "more stringent" state laws relating to
access to medical records4 12 in cases where the state law "permits greater rights of
access or amendment." 413 The 1999 Health Privacy Project State Report found that
thirty-three states provide a right of access to hospital records; thirteen states provide
a right of access to HMO records; and sixteen states provide a right of access to
insurance records. 4 14 As a result, provisions of state law-particularly those based on
the Uniform Health-Care Information Act4 15 which was adopted by Montana416 and
406 45 C.F.R. § 164.526(a)(1) (2001).
407 45 C.F.R. § 164.526(a)(2) (2001).
408 45 C.F.R. § 164.526(d)(1) (2001).
409 45 C.F.R. § 164.526(d)(2) (2001).
410 CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123100 (West 2001).
411 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-502(2) (2000).
412 See generally 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.203-160.205 (2001).
413 45 C.F.R. § 160.202(2) (2001).
414 See HEALTH PRIVACY STATE REP., supra note 53, at 10.
415 UNIFORM HEALTH-CARE INFO. ACT (1985), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
bll/ulc/fnact99/1980s/uhcia85.htm. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
has recently released a discussion draft, PROPOSED REVISIONS OF UNIFORM HEALTH CARE INFO. ACT
(2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uhcia/hci06OO.htm. According to the
Commissioners:
The Act has been revised to reflect the explosion in information technology and
changes in the practice of medicine through managed care and large multi-state
providers. Moreover, the recent flurry of state legislation and proposed model acts has
largely bypassed the 1985 Uniform Act, possibly because of concerns over limitations
in its scope and safeguard provisions and because the language does not reflect
electronic technology. The revised Act addresses those concerns by expanding
coverage under the Act to persons receiving health care information in the regular
course of business, by strengthening the requirements for security safeguards, and by
drafting to reflect modern computer technology and electronic transmissions.
416 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 27 NO. 4 2001
Washington, 417 or in other states that have comprehensive medical privacy laws41 8-
may have an impact on malpractice litigation. For example, the Montana statute
imposes a tighter timetable on patient requests for access to the record,419 and the
provider can be requested to explain codes used in the record.420 Overall, however,
and keeping in mind that this is an area where generalizations are difficult due to
varying levels of detail and applicability, most state access laws seem to provide for
conceptually similar access, amendment and accounting rules. 421
D. HIPAA-EDI EXPANDING THE CPR
Assumptions have been made above about institutions that adopt comprehensive
CPR systems, in large part driven by the HIPAA-EDI mandate, but also to facilitate
compliance with other regulatory and accreditation reporting requirements. Once
adopted, however, it is likely that the breadth of these systems will continue to grow,
as will their potential utility for malpractice plaintiffs.
Roughly one-quarter of online physicians communicate with their patients via
email. 422 Increasingly, physicians are finding it an attractive medium because it is
potentially rich-for example, facilitating the inclusion of URL references to other
resources that the patient should consider-and it is self-documenting, in that the
stored communications create their own "record" on the doctor's or her institution's
computer. This latter factor, coupled with the obvious fact that it contains
"individually identified health information" "transmitted by electronic media," 423 will
subject a patient-physician email dialog to PIHI regulation.
Perhaps less obvious is how the CPR will swell with conversations between care
provider and patient. In practice, the PIHI rules will seldom apply to purely oral
communications; nor do they impose any duty to record such conversations.
However, if an entity does record or transcribe a conversation, and such records are
maintained and used to make decisions about the individual, then they would be
swept into the path of PIHI. 424 This issue is likely to cause particular difficulty as
institutions exploit their new information infrastructures by migrating from
traditional telephone systems to routing-not to mention monitoring and recording-
their voice communications through existing data networks. 425 This presumably will
convert transient oral communications into electronic media created or received by
the provider, thereby subjecting it to PIHI.
The expanding CPR may also interest attorneys seeking to construct malpractice
claims based on aggregate data. Assume that the attorney is constructing a loss-of-
PROPOSED REVISIONS OF UNIFORM HEALTH CARE INFO. ACT 2 (2000).
416 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-16-501 to 50-6-504 (2000).
417 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.02.005 to 70.02.904 (2000).
418 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56-56.37 (West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37-22 (2000); WIS.
S rAT. §§ 146.83, 610.70(3) (2001).
419 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-541(1) (2000).
420 MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-541(2) (2000).
421 "[ln many ways, the state laws defy summarization C (sic)they are detailed,
specific, and intricate." HEALTH PRIVACY STATE REP., supra note 53, at 10.
422 See Press Release, AM. MED. ASS'N., AMA Survey Finds Upsurge in Physician Usage and
Regard for Internet, May 9, 2001, availabie at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/l 616.html.
423 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001).
424 GUIDANCE/Q&AS, supra note 37.
425 This is known as TCP/IP telephony. See generally MICROSOFT, MICROSOFT WINDOWS 2000
SERVER DOCUMENTATION: IP TELEPHONY CONCEPTS, at http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/en/
server/help/default.asp (last visited No ,. 12, 2001).
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chance case426 in which the national survival rate for the allegedly undiagnosed
disease in question is 20%, a statistic which would operate as the damages multiplier.
Now assume that the defendant hospital has a survival rate with the disease diagnosed
believed to be 40%.427 The PIHI rules, in contrast to the conventional discovery
arguments that plaintiffs will make-not necessarily with success-would not seem
to provide a basis to compel the hospital to generate even de-identified data pertinent
to survival rates. 428 Consistent with this interpretation, the California statute defines
medical records subject to its patient access law as "only records pertaining to the
patient requesting the records or whose representative requests the records" and not
including "information given in confidence to a health care provider by a person
other than another health care provider or the patient" or "information contained in
aggregate form, such as indices, registers, or logs." 429
A new round of empirical studies will be required before the pro-plaintiff
impact of HIPAA-EDI, related technologies and new error reporting paradigms can
be conclusively demonstrated. Furthermore, malpractice attorneys, insurers and risk
managers may not see all the implications of HIPAA-EDI until healthcare institutions
have the next generation of CPRs up and running. The availability of comprehensive
records and the growth of non-peer-review reporting, however, should inevitably lead
to the identification of additional occurrences of malpractice. Coupled with the
additional access and data that malpractice plaintiffs will receive courtesy of PIHI,
this should lead to a significant decrease in false negatives and increase the
settlement value of heretofore marginal cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
Managed care has become the pifiata of modern healthcare reform. 430 In the
process, we have freighted what is little more than a somewhat flawed financing
system with all the ills of modern healthcare delivery. 431 Hopefully, the passage of a
Patient's Bill of Rights432 will bring closure on the more excessive claims of those on
both sides of the debate, and enable us to concentrate our energies on the more
pressing issues of patient privacy and medical error.
The rhetoric of privacy and improved quality may not yet be as powerful as that
seen in prior debates over individual rights such as the fight for patient autonomy.
Neither, at first sight, does the somewhat impersonal medium of information
technology appear to be a likely conduit of satisfactory reform. Indeed, nothing said
426 For a primer, see Michelle L. Truckor, Comment, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: Legal
Recovery for Patients on the Edge Of Survival, 24 DAYTON L. REV. 349 (1999).
427 This percentage is still below the summary judgment standard for "more probable than not"
under a conventional causation standard. See, e.g., Bell v. United States, 854 F.2d 881, 883 (6th Cir.
1988).
428 See. e.g., Shady Grove Psychiatric Group v. Md., 736 A.2d 1168, 1173 (Md. 1999) (noting
that under extant Maryland law a health care provider is required to disclose a medical record to a
prosecution agency pursuant to a subpoena issued in a criminal investigation, but only if the
prosecution agency first proves that it has written procedures to protect the confidentiality of that
record).
429 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123105(d) (West 2001).
430 See generally Robin Toner, After Patients'Rights: Vast Needs, Higher Hurdles, N.Y.TIMES,
July 2, 2001, at All (discussing the multitude of issues confronting Congress after passage of the
Patient's Bill of Rights).
431 See Milt Freudenheim, A Changing World is Forcing Changes on Managed Care, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2001, at Al (discussing how managed care is evolving under pressure from doctors,
patients, consumer advocates and employers).
432 E.g., Bipartisan Patient Protection Act, S. 1052, 107th Cong (2001).
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here should be taken to suggest that increased use of information technologies is the
panacea for rectifying all medical error,433 or will not itself lead to a new raft of
difficult legal and ethical issues.
Only recently has the healthcare industry signaled that it is poised to embark on
an IT revolution.434 The industry's track record heretofore has not been stellar.
Indeed, it has been glacial in its adoption of new technologies that have been
aggressively deployed in other industries. 435 Blame for such reticence may be laid at
the feet of reluctant physicians 436 and institutions that have been disinclined to
commit to the necessary level of investment.437 HIPAA-EDI, unpleasant medicine
that it is for many providers, 438 is the crucial incentive that will trigger the long-
awaited revolution.
Health privacy and the reduction of medical error share a philosophical heart-
the reaffirmation of the responsibilities of the healthcare system to individual
consumers. As we develop our responses to these issues, health lawyers will begin to
appreciate that the familiar triad of quality assurance, access and cost reduction share
a common link in healthcare processes and technologies.
Health privacy has become politicized and no doubt a similar fate will befall
attempts to legislate error reduction. Privacy regulation will continue to attract
headlines and legal challenges, 439 as surely as Congress 440 and the executive will
433 See, for example, recent evidence-based research commissioned by AHRQ that studied
documented methods of improving patient safety and identified eleven essentially clinical measures as
having the most potential impact. MAKING HEALTH CARE SAFER, supra note 126, at v-vi.
434 See Robert McCarthy, Health Care Dragged, Clicking and Beeping, Into the Digital Age, 13
DRUG BENEFIT TRENDS 20, 25 (2001); Craig Stoltz, Welcome to the #?!!*&*! Future of Medicine,
WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2001, at T8; Bill Scanlon, The Net is a Prescription for Medicine, ZDNET
INTERACTIVE WEEK (Mar. 19, 2001), at http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/stories/news/0,4164,269679 1,
00.html.
435 Jennifer Steinhauer, In a Health Revolution, a Hospital's Baby Steps, N.Y. TIMES, at
http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/10/biztech/technology/ (Oct. 25, 2000).
436 The latest AMA survey suggests some movement here. Although the proportion of
physicians having a Web site has leveled off, the survey discloses significant increases in physician use
of the Web for research and as a resource for patient education. Furthermore, roughly one-quarter of
online physicians communicate with their patients via email. See Press Release, AM MED. ASS'N,
AMA Survey Finds Upsurge in Physician Usage and Regard for Internet, May 9, 2001, available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/1616.html. See also Tyler Chin, Tech Effect: Better health
Care Through Information Technology, AMA NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_01/tesa08I3.htm; HARRIS INTERACTIVE, New Data Show Internet,
Website and Email Usage by Physicians all Increasing, 8 HEALTH CARE NEWS, Feb. 26, 2001,
available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/newslettershealthcare.asp.
437 There are, of course, exceptions. See, e.g., Assoc. Press, Digital Hospital Moves Health Care
into Internet Age, USA TODAY, at http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/2001-03-27-hospital.htm
(Mar. 27, 2001); Press Release, HEALTHSOUTH, HEALTHSOUTH, Oracle to Build Groundbreaking
Digital Hospital, Mar. 26, 2001, available at http://www.healthsouth.com.
438 Gartner's second quarterly survey on compliance with the regulations of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) completed in
February 2001, showed that only 18 percent of healthcare payer organizations
and 4 percent ofhealthcare providers had at least begun planning the remediation
for all of their application software.
See WES RISHEL, GARTNER RESEARCH INC., THE Y2K LESSON FOR HIPAA: NAIL DOWN YOUR
VENDORS EARLY 1 (2001), available at http://www3.gartner.com/1 _research
analysis/focus/healthfa.html.
439 See, e.g., S.C. Med. Ass'n v. HHS, D.S.C., No. C/A 3-01-2965 (D. S.C. July 16, 2001)
(challenging the constitutionality of section 264 of HIPAA as violative of separation of powers). See
also Mike Stobbe, SCMA Fights New Patient Information Rules, THE STATE, July 16, 2001, available
at http://web.thestate.com/content/columbia/2001/07/16/local/medrulesl6.htm; Press Release, ASS'N
AM. PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS, AAPS Doctors Sue to Stop HHS Privacy Regs/Release Survey of
Doctors on HIPAA Rules, July 31, 2001, available at http://www.aapsonline.org.
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engage in endless tweaking of the PIHI regulations 441 and the states will append their
own rules. Notwithstanding, the privacy regulations and all the other EDI-associated
HIPAA regulations will persevere as crucial collaborators in the reduction of medical
error and the reshaping of medical malpractice law. Linked by common technologies
and consistent philosophies, the protection of patient privacy and the reduction of
medical error will be the dominant concerns for the next decade of healthcare reform
and will stimulate many of the structural changes we will experience, particularly the
increased use of information technologies to deliver healthcare services. In the
process, medical malpractice law and litigation will undergo their own revolution,
reshaped by these very technologies, processes and patient expectations.
440 See, e.g., HEALTH DATA MGMT., Legislators Ask Thompson to Fix Privacy Rule, Provide
Funds, available at http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/html/hipaa/hipaa.cfm (July 19, 2001)
(discussing letters to Secretary Thompson from 165 House and fifteen Senate members urging changes
to privacy rule and financial assistance for providers). See also S. 1684, 107th Cong. (2001) (providing
a one year extension of the date for compliance with EDI, but not the privacy aspects of the HIPAA
regulations).
441 See, e.g., GUIDANCE/Q&As, supra note 37. Specifically, the Guidance answered the
following question:
Q: What changes might you make in the final rule?
A: We continue to review the input received during the recent public comment
period to determine what changes are appropriate to ensure that the rule protects
patient privacy as intended without harming consumers' access to care or the
quality of that care.
Examples of standards in the Privacy Rule for which we will propose changes are:
* Phoned-in Prescriptions ...
* Referral Appointments ...
" Allowable Communications ...
* .Minimum Necessary Scope ....
In addition, HHS may reevaluate the Privacy Rule to ensure that parents have
appropriate access to information about the health and well-being of their
children ....
Other changes to the Privacy Rule also may be considered as appropriate.
See also the Aug. 6, 2001 letter to DHHS Secretary Thompson from eighty-six healthcare and
employer organizations urging the Secretary to "move as expeditiously as possible" to modify the
privacy regulations, available at http://www.hipaadvisory.com/news/2001/hlc0806.htm.

